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On January 22 the Belgian legislator adopted two draft laws concerning 
the approval of a number of maritime boundary délimitation agreements 
entered into by the executive : (1) A first one relates to two agreements 
concluded with France more than two years ago. These agreements delimit 
the latéral boundary of territorial sea (2) and the continental shelf (3) 
between the parties. A second one relates to a more recently concluded con­
tinental shelf boundary agreement with the United Kingdom (4). At the 
time of writing, no publication in the Moniteur belge had occured yet.
(*) The author wishes to thank P . G a u t ie r , Adjunct Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
J. P a r é e , Head Engineer-Director of Mines, Ministry of Economie Affairs and C. V a n  Ca u w e n - 
b e r g h e , Head of the Hydrographie Department (Belgium) ; D. A n d e r s o n , Foreign & Com- 
monwealth Office (United Kingdom) ; and J.-P. Q u é n e u d e c , Professor at the Université de
Paris I Pantheon------- Sorbonne (France) for the help received while preparing this article. The
maps were only possible thanks to the kind coopération of Prof. R. Paepe of the Vrije Univer- 
siteit Brussel, Head Geologist-Director of the Belgian Geological Suivey, who allowed me to 
make use of his sophisticated computer facilities to produce these illustrations.
(1) The Senate was the last chamber to give its approval. See Ann. pari. Sénat N° 49, p. 1438 
(1992-1993). About a month earlier the House of Représentatives had already done so. See Ann. 
pari. Chambre N° 48, pp. 13/428-429.
(2) Accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique et le Gouvernement de la 
République française relatif à la délimitation de la mer territoriale (Agreement Between the 
Kingdom of Belgium and the French Republic Concerning the Délimitation o f the Territorial 
Sea), October 8, 1990. Authentic French text, as kindly provided by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, to be found in Annex I. For an English translation, see for instance 19, Law of the Sea 
Bulletin, pp. 27-28 (October 1991). Hereinafter cited as B-F Territorial Sea Agreement.
(3) Accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique et le Gouvernement de la 
République française relatif à la délimitation du plateau continental (Agreement Between the 
Kingdom of Belgium and the French Republic Concerning the Délimitation of the Continental 
Shelf), October 8, 1990. Authentic French text, as kindly provided by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, to be found in Annex II. For an English translation, see for instance 19, Law of the Sea 
Bulletin, pp. 29-30 (October 1991). Hereinafter cited as B-F Continental Shelf Agreement.
(4) Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the 
Continental Shelf Between the Two Countries, May 29, 1991. Authentic English text, as kindly 
provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be found in Annex III. Hereinafter cited as 
B-UK Continental Shelf Agreement.
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Belgium normally awaits the entry into force of international agreements 
to do so. Ail three agreements provide for the exchange of notifications as 
method of entry into force (5).
(5) B-F Territorial Sea Agreement, supra, note 2, Art. 3 ; B-F Continental Shelf Agreement, 
supra, note 3, Art. 3 ; and B-UK Continental Shelf Agreement, supra, note 4, Art. 2. According 
to the former two agreements, the date of reception of the last notifÜQation will be determining. 
The latter only mentions the exchange of notifications as such. France was the first country to 
do so by means of a notification dated November 29, 1990. Belgium notified France and the
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This article analyzes the tortuous road by which Belgium, sometimes 
more than 20 years after initial talks on the subject started, finally arrived 
at a maritime boundary settlement with two of its maritime neighbors. As 
was the case with the extension of the territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical 
miles (n.m.) (6), these recent steps taken by Belgium can certainly not be 
qualifïed as representing an avant-garde position. The following statement 
by a commentator illustrâtes this point fairly well :
« (1)1 y  a des pays qui ... se sont abstenus de collaborer au développement 
de la délimitation maritime. La Belgique, par exemple, bien que participant 
d’un ensemble géographique où sont déjà nombreuses les délimitations, n’a 
pas nullement progressé dans la fixation des limites maritimes avec les pays 
voisins, l ’Angleterre, la Hollande et la France » (7).
Before turning to these agreements, however, their broader context must 
be highlighted. Indeed, taken into account the rather late date of their con­
clusion, these recent agreements entered into by Belgium cannot be under- 
stood without reference to the chain of previously established maritime 
boundaries in the area, of which they appear to form a closing link. An 
international and régional context will therefore précédé the analysis of the 
Belgian boundary agreements proper.
I . —  I n t e r n a t io n a l  s e t t in g
Maritime boundary délimitations have received increased attention dur- 
ing the last couple of years. This submission can be substantiated by 
reference to a whole list of indications pointing in that direction. First of 
ail, governments have been trying to settle maritime boundaries with their 
neighbors at a steady pace lately (8). A very substantial amount of the
United Kingdom on April 6, 1993. At the time of writing (April 22, 1993), however, France had 
not yet acknowledged receipt of this Belgian notification. As far as the United Kingdom is con- 
cerned, this country had been waiting since 1991 (see infra, note 294) for Belgium to fulfil its 
constitutional requirements in order to be able to exchange notifications on the same date. The 
unilatéral action of Belgium in this respect will now urge the United Kingdom to act in a similar 
way in the near future.
(6) See F r a n c k x , E., «Belgium Extends its Territorial Sea up to 12 Nautical Miles», 20, 
Revue Belge de Droit International, pp. 41-71 (1987/1). About the timeliness, see especially p. 60. 
See also the conclusion reached at that time that the negotiation of délimitation agreements was 
the next item on the agenda (ibid., p. 71).
(7) R u f in o , G.d’A., «Délimitation maritime en droit international», 6, Espaces et Ressources 
Maritimes, 1992, pp. 85, 91 (1993).
(8) As may be illustrated by the following recent publications of the United Nations Office 
on the Law of the Sea : United Nations, The Law of the Sea : Maritime Boundary Délimitations 
(1970-1984), United Nations, Office for Océan Affairs and the Law of the Sea (1987) ; United 
Nations, The Law of the Sea : Maritime Boundary Délimitations (1942-1969), United Nations, 
Office for Océan Affairs and the Law of the Sea (1991) ; and United Nations, The Law of the Sea : 
Maritime Boundary Délimitations (1985-1991), United Nations, Office for Océan Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea (1992).
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cases were moreover brought before the International Court of Justice (9) 
for third party settlement during the last couple of decades which relate to 
maritime délimitation disputes (10). This is still so today (11). In fact, it 
were law of the sea cases, many of which related to maritime boundary 
délimitation questions, which granted the I.C. J. a second life after a period 
of quasi inactivity during the second half of the 1960s (12). But also 
arbitration has been frequently resorted to by states as a peaceful means 
of settlement of maritime boundary disputes if diplomatic means proved to 
be of no avail (13). These juridical means relied upon by states in order to 
solve their lingering boundary disputes have in turn generated a con­
sidérable quantity of literature on the subject. It will suffïce in this respect 
to point at the interest aroused in the legal literature by the recent arbitra­
tion between Canada and France relating to St. Pierre and Miquelon (14).
(9) Hereinafter cited as I.C.J.
(10) These cases are : North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fédéral Republic o f Germany/Den- 
mark, Fédéral Republic of Germany/The Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. Reports 3 ; Aegean Sea Con­
tinental Shelf (Greece/Turkey), 1976 I.G.J. Reports 3 ; Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. Reports 18 ; Case Concerning Délimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine (Canada/United States), 1984 I.C.J. Reports 246 ; Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. Reports 13 ; 
Application for Révision and Interprétation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1985 I.C.J. Reports 191 ; 
Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau/Senegal), 1991 I.C.J. 
Reports 53 ; Land, Islands and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras ; Nicaragua 
Intervening), 1992 I.C.J. Reports 351.
(11) See for example D e c a tjx , E., « Chronique du plateau continental et des délimitations », 
6, Espaces et Ressources Maritimes, 1992, pp. 113, 119-122 (1993).
(12) The adverse influence of the I.C.J. décision in the South West Africa cases cannot be 
overlooked in this respect. Since 1969, it has been stated, the I.C.J. has established its primacy 
in law of the sea matters. See H ig h e t , K., « The Peace Palace Heats Up : The World Court in 
Business Again ? », 85, American Journal of International Law, pp. 646, 653-654 (1991), who 
stressed moreover that two-thirds of the cases pending before the I.C.J. at that time related 
directly to the law of the sea.
(13) It will suffice to browse through the International Legal Materials-series to illustrate this 
point : Beagle Channel Arbitral Award of February 18, 1977 (Argentina/Chile), 17, International 
Legal Materials, pp. 632-679 (1978) ; Délimitation of the Continental Shelf o f June 30, 1977 
(France/United Kingdom), 18, International Legal Materials, pp. 397-494 (1979) ; Report and 
Recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and Norway of the Conciliation Commission 
on the Continental Shelf Area Between Iceland and Jan Mayen of May 1981, 20, International 
Legal Materials, pp. 797-842 (1981) ; Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau of 
February 14, 1985, 25, International Legal Materials, pp. 252-307 (1986) ; Délimitation of 
Maritime Areas Between France and Canada of June 10, 1992 (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 31, 
International Legal Materials, pp. 1145-1219 (1992).
(14) See fo r  in sta n ce  M oD o r m a n , T .,  « T h e  C a n a d a -F ra n ce  Maritime B o u n d a ry  Case : D ra w - 
in g  a  L in e  A r o u n d  St. P ierre  a n d  Miquelon », 84, American Journal of International Law, p p . 157- 
189 (1990) ; D a y , A .,  « T h e  Saint P ierre  & Miquelon Maritime B o u n d a r y » ,  In tern a tion a l B o u n ­
daries R e se a rch  U n it  —  B o u n d a ry  B r ie fin g  N o . 5, D u rh a m  (1990); Ch a r n e y , J., « Canada- 
F ra n ce  (St. P ierre  a n d  Miquelon), R e p o r t  N u m b e r  1-2 A d d e n d u m » , in  International Maritime 
Boundaries, V o l .  1, infra, n o te  20, p p . 399 — 400 ; d e  L a  F a y e t t e , L .,  « T h e  A w a rd  in  th e  
C a n a d a -F ra n ce  Maritime B o u n d a ry  A r b it r a t io n » , 8, The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, p p . 77-103 (1993); P o l it a k is , G., « T h e  F b e n c h  — C a n a d ia n  A r b it r a t io n  
A r o u n d  St . P ie r r e  a n d  M iq u e l o n  : U n m a s k e d  O p p o r t u n is m  a n d  t h e  T e iu m p h  o f  t h e  
U n e x p e c t e d  », 8, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,p p . 105-134 (1993); 
Sc o v a z z i , T .,  « L ’a ffa ire  d e  la  d é lim ita tion  d es  e sp a ces  m a ritim es  en tre  le  C a n ad a  e t  la  F ra n ce  :
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But besides these exhaustive analyses of décisions of the I.C.J. or arbitra­
tion tribunals, scholars have also devoted due attention to the different 
elements of state practice in this respect to be found in the many délimita­
tion agreements concluded so far between states (15).
Despite this wealth of information, authoritative voices in this particular 
field of law have drawn attention to the fact that an exhaustive study, or 
even a ditto compilation, of ail existing maritime boundaries was simply 
lacking (16).
In an attempt to bridge this gap, the American Society of International 
Law set up a large-scale project during the late 1980s the object of which 
was exactly to provide an in depth examination of state practice in this 
field arising from more than 100 existing océan boundary délimita­
tions (17). Two meetings, gathering ail participants, were organized in order 
to outline (18) and subsequently discuss the results of the project (19). The 
final outcome of this project is a two volume book entitled International 
Maritime Boundaries (20). This book consists of three main parts. First of 
ail régional experts gathered and analyzed data on settled maritime boun­
daries (21). Individual reports were drawn up based on these fïndings accor-
exagérer, mesurer ou nécessiter ? », 6, Espaces et Ressources Maritimes, 1992, pp. 61-83 (1993). A 
complete French text of the award was published in 96 Revue Générale de Droit Interantional 
Public, pp. 672-751 (1992).
(15) For a général bibliography on the subject published during the early 1980s, see McDor- 
m a n , T., Beauchamp, K. & Johnston, D., Maritime Boundary Délimitation (An Annotated Bibli­
ography), Lexington, Heath & Co., 207 pp. (1983). Useful listings of such agreements can also 
be found in materials presented to the I.C.J. by the parties involved in maritime délimitation 
disputes around that same time period. See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning 
Délimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine (Canada/United States), Annexes 
to the Reply Submitted by Canada, Volume I, State Practice, December 12, 1983 and Interna­
tional Court of Justice, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Annex of Délimita­
tion Agreements Submitted by the Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Counter-Memorial, 
Volume II, Parts 1 and 2, October 26, 1983. This tendency still continues as can be inferred from 
a quick glance at the Max Planck Bibliography of Public International Law.
(16) W e il , P., Perspectives du droit de la délimitation maritime, Paris, Pedone, p. 166 (1988).
(17) Funding was provided by primary grants from the Ford and Mellon Foundations, as well 
as grants from the Amoco and Mobil Foundations and Exxon Corporation.
(18) Washington, D.C., December 13-14, 1988.
(19) Airlie, Virginia, December 13-16, 1989.
(20) (Ch a b n e y , J. & A l e x a n d e r , L., eds.), 2 Vols., Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2138 pp. 
(1993). Hereinafter cited as International Maritime Boundaries.
(21) The world was divided in 10 régions for this purpose, resulting in a same number of 
régional experts being involved in the project :
North America —  L. A l e x a n d e r  ;
Middle America and Caribbean —  K. N w e ih e d  ;
South America —  E. J im e n e z  d e  A r e c s a g a  ;
A frica  —  A . A d e d e  ;
Central Pacific/East Asia — C.-H. Park ;
Indian Océan and South East Asia —  V. P r e s c o t t  ;
Persian Gulf —  R. P ie t r o w s k i  a n d  L. A l e x a n d e r  ;
Mediterranean and Black Seas —  T. S c o v a z z i  ;
Northern and Western Europe —  D. A n d e b s o n  ; a n d
Baltic Sea —  the present author.
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ding to a rigid, 9-point outline (22). This information then formed the basis 
for the analytical part of the project, which itself consisted of two separate 
parts. First the régional experts prepared régional papers synthesizing the 
results of their findings (23). Secondly, subject experts analyzed the boun­
daries from a global perspective, according to the nine considérations which 
served as outline for the individual reports (24). This book was only 
recently presented to the press (25).
One caveat should nevertheless be added with respect to this new publi­
cation. Even if it can be stated to provide a comprehensive source of pre- 
sent-day boundary settlements, arrived at by agreements as well as by 
means of third party settlement, one should not try to fïnd in it the final 
exposition of a firm substantive rule of international law to be strictly 
adhered to in future boundary délimitations. Indeed, one of the most strik- 
ing conclusions of the study is that, despite this wealth of state practice, 
no rule of customary international law seems to have crystallized yet. Or 
to use the words of the director of the project :
« In my opinion these global and régional papers and the individual bound­
ary reports support the conclusion that no normative principle of interna­
tional law has developed that would mandate the spécifié location of any 
maritime boundary line. The state practice varies substantially. Due to the 
unlimited géographie and other circumstances that influence the settlements, 
no binding rule that would be suffïciently determinative to enable one to 
predict the location of a maritime boundary with any degree of précision is 
likely to evolve in the near future » (26).
Even though the opinio juris is clearly not present according to this 
author, trends and practices have nevertheless emerged that are substan- 
tial (27).
It is the intention of this paper, therefore, to rely on this valuable and 
up to date source of information. Certainly not as the ultimate exposition 
of a golden rule against which the recently concluded agreements by
(22) Nine considérations were to be addressed by each and every individual boundary report : 
1) Political, strategie and historical considérations ; 2) legal regime considérations ; 3) economic 
and environmental considérations ; 4) géographie considérations ; 5) islands, rocks, reefs and 
low-tide élévations considérations ; 6) baseline considérations ; 7) geological and geomorphologi- 
cal considérations ; 8) method of délimitation considérations ; and fïnally 9) technical considéra­
tions. Ail reports provide the text of the délimitations. Illustrative maps were moreover drawn 
up and annexed to each one of them.
(23) Resulting in 10 régional papers. See mpra, note 21.
(24 ) F o r  th ese  con sid éra tion s  see mpra, n o te  22 . T h ese  s u b je c t  ex p erts  w ere  (in  the sam e 
order) : 1) B . O x m a n  ; 2 ) D. Co l s o n  ; 3) B . K w ia t k o w s k a  ; 4 ) P . W e il  ; 5) D. B o w e t t  ; 6) L .  
S o h n  ; 7) K. H ig h e t  ; 8) L . L eoatjt.t  & B . H a h k e y  ; a n d  9 ) P . B e a z l e y .
(25) On Wednesday March 3, 1993 a briefing for the public and press représentatives was held 
at the headquarters of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. A similar 
briefing will be organized for the European press on July 27, 1993 at The Hague.
(26) Charney, J., «Introduction», in International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1, mpra, 
note 20, p. xm .
(27) Ibid.
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Belgium ought to be measured and judged, but rather as an accurate 
description of the général background against which the recent Belgian 
practice in this particular field has to be understood. Especially the reports 
drawn up by the subject experts will be extremely helpful in this respect 
in order to provide this général framework, together of course with the 
régional report on the Northern and Western European Maritime Boun­
daries (28) as prepared by D. Anderson (29). But also the individual bound­
ary reports prepared by the latter author on the agreements recently 
entered into by Belgium, will be relied upon (30).
Before concluding the international part of this article, a few words must 
be said on the relevant rules of international law concerning maritime 
boundary délimitation as they are relevant for the Belgian situation in its 
relation to France and the United Kingdom. Three conventions should be 
mentioned in this respect. First of ail the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone (31) and the Convention of the Continental 
Shelf (32), both concluded at Geneva in 1958 as a resuit of the first United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (33). Reference should also be 
made to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (34). 
Even though this latter convention has not yet entered into force (35), its 
influence on the emerging principles of the law of sea contained therein can- 
not be denied (36).
Starting point for any territorial sea or continental shelf délimitation is 
the baseline. The latter can take two forms, either what is called a normal
(28) A n d e r s o n , D.,« Northern and Western European Maritime Boundaries », in International 
Maritime Boundariesy Vol. 1, supra, note 20, pp. 331-341.
(29) D. A n d e r s o n  is Second Legal Adviser in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the 
United Kingdom.
(30) International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 2, supra, note 20, pp. 1891-1912 (Reports Num- 
ber 9-16 and 9-17).
(31) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 
516 U.N.T.S. 205. This convention entered into force on September 10, 1964. Hereinafter cited 
as 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.
(32) Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. This convention 
entered into force on June 10, 1964. Hereinafter cited as 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.
(33) Hereinafter cited as UNCLOS I.
(34) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on December 10,
1982, reprinted in United Nations, The Law of the Sea : United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (U.N. Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5) 224 pp. (1983). Hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention. 
This Convention was the resuit o f almost 10 years of negotiation at the third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III).
(35) According to the latest report of the Secretary-General on the law of the sea 52 of the 
required 60 instruments of ratification or accession had been deposited (situation as at October 1, 
1992). See Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/623 of November 24, 
1992. By February 1993, this list had increased to 64. St. Kitt & Nevis was the last state to join. 
See 10, Océans Policy News, p. 1 (February 1993).
(36) Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-General : Progress Made in the Implementation 
of the Comprehensive Legal Regime Embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/47/512 of November 5, 1992, 24 pp. Concerning the délimitation aspect, 
see especially p. 13.
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baseline, i.e. the low-water line (37), or a straight baseline (38). The latter 
method is only indirectly of importance in the area here under discussion 
in as far as it relates to juridical bays (39). Of special importance here, as 
will be seen below, are the provisions on low-tide élévations (40) as well as 
those relating to permanent harbor works (41) which. both can be included 
in the baseline (42). As far as the délimitation itself is concerned, the 
1958 and 1982 law of the sea conventions provide a général framework 
which is, however, rather diffïcult to apply in practice because the rules 
contained therein are indeterminate and may not even reflect customary 
international law. The territorial sea received a similar treatment in 
1958 and 1982, namely an equidistance —  special circumstances rule (43). 
But if one tums to the délimitation provisions concerning the continental 
shelf, one cannot but conclude that the already indeterminate equidistance- 
special circumstances rule, to be found in the 1958 Continental Shelf Con­
vention (44), was replaced by an even vaguer construction which merely
(37) See 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 3, and 1982 Convention, Art. 5.
(38) See 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 4, and 1982 Convention, Art. 7.
(39) See 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 7, and 1982 Convention, Art. 10. The Thames 
estuary is a juridical bay, enclosed by a strait line. See map 2. According to Anderson, this bay- 
closing line was not taken into account. Its location prevents it from influencing a possible equi­
distance line. It had no influence on the agreed boundary with Belgium either. See A n d e r s o n , 
D., «Report Number 9-17», supra, note 30, p. 1901, 1904.
(40) See 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 11, and 1982 Convention, Art. 13.
(41) See 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 8, and 1982 Convention, Art. 11.
(42) Low-tide élévations, however, have to be located wholly or partly at a distance not 
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea measured from the mainland or an island.
(43) See 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 12, and 1982 Convention, Art. 15. Even 
though the formulation is not exactly the same, the essential rule contained therein remained 
unchanged. Only the 1982 Convention will therefore be cited here : « Where the coasts of two 
States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agree­
ment between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the médian line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, 
however, where it is necessary by reason of historie title or other special circumstances to delimit 
the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith ».
(44) 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, Art. 6. This article states : « 1. Where the same con­
tinental shelf is adjacent to the territories o f two or more States whose coasfcs are opposite each 
other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by 
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is 
justifïed by special circumstances, the boundary is the médian line, every point of which is equi­
distant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of 
each State is measured. 2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two 
adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between 
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justifïed by special cir­
cumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance 
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
State is measured. 3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are 
drawn in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should be 
defîned with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a particular date, and 
reference should be made to flxed permanent identifiable points on the land. »
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refers to equitable solutions based on international law (45). Moreover, the 
1958 délimitation rule concerning the continental shelf was found not to 
reflect customary international law by the I.C.J (46). It might be added, 
finally, that the délimitation provision concerning the newly created 
exclusive economic zone in the 1982 Convention is a copy of the just-men- 
tioned continental shelf article (47).
Having analyzed this international legal framework, its should come as 
no surprise that state practice is so diverse on the subject. Because of the 
extremely fact intensive nature of délimitation law, these rules do not seem 
to be able to provide firm guidance either for negotiators, arbitral tribunals 
or courts (48). Nevertheless they create the basic structure, however broad 
it may be, according to which délimitation questions have to be settled.
II. —  R é g i o n a l  s e t t i n g
It is not the intention of this régional section to give a detailed survey 
of ail the boundary délimitation agreements so far concluded in the North 
Sea area (49). This has already been done by the present author else-
(45) 1982 Convention, Art. 83. Here one can read : « 1. The délimitation of the continental 
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis 
of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statut© of the International Court of 
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. 2. I f  no agreement can be reached within a 
reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in 
Part XV [third party dispute settlement]. 3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, 
the States concerned, in the spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not 
to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final délimitation. 4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States 
concerned, questions relating to the délimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in 
accordance with the provisions of that agreement ». Because of its vagueness, this new approach 
has been labeled as a « ‘ décodification* de la matière». See T b e v e s , T .,  «Codification du droit 
international et pratique des états dans le droit de la mer», 223, Recueil des Cours (IV 1990), 
Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, p. 11, 104 (1991).
(46) North Sea Continental Shelf cases, swpra, note 10, p. 45.
(47) 1982 Convention, Art. 74. Because of the identical wording used by Arts 74 (exclusive 
economic zone) and 83 (continental shelf), the former is not reproduced here in full. Reference 
can be made to Art. 83, swpra, note 45.
(48) Charnby, J., « Maritime Jurisdiction and the Secession of States : The Case of Québec », 
25, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 343, 374-375 (1992).
(49) The North Sea has been defîned by the International Conference on the Protection of 
the North Sea as the area comprised by 62° north, Skagerrak and the English Channel east of 
longitude 5° west. See Addendum to the Déclaration of the First International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea (Bremen, 1984), as reprinted in The North Sea : Basic Légal 
Documents on Régional Environmental Co-operation (F b e e s t o n e , D. & I J l s t r a , T., eds.), Dor­
drecht, Martinus Nijhoff, p. 78 (1991). For the purpose of this paper, which focuses on délimita­
tion aspects, only the latter element will be adapted : Instead of « east if longitude 5° west, » 
including the whole English Channel, only the area « east of longitude 0° 30' west i will be taken 
into account, which excludes most of the English Channel but does include the Straits of Dover. 
The latter limit was preferred because it has been used in the délimitation practice between 
France and the United Kingdom to distinguish between different areas to be delimited (see for
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where (50). Instead, because of the pivotai position occupied by Belgium in 
this article, the délimitation practice of ail its maritime neighbors will be 
analyzed. Not only inter se, but also in their relation to other countries, at 
least in as far as these agreements relate to the North Sea (51). The recent 
agreements concluded by Belgium, which will be discussed in detail later 
on, are left out of the picture in this régional survey. Because of a clear dif­
férence in importance, a distinction will be made between the continental 
shelf, territorial sea and, fïnally, fïshery and exclusive economic zone 
délimitations.
A. —  Continental shelf
The essence of the early délimitation history of the North Sea is closely 
related to the continental shelf notion, and more particularly to the coming 
into force of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention on June 10, 1964 (52). 
North Sea countries, in other words, waited until international law had 
provided them with a sound basis for this rather novel concept (53) before 
they started délimitation negotiations. It should not come as a surprise, 
therefore, that the parties strongly relied on the equidistance principle 
which Art. 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention seemed to attribute 
a special status during those early years (54). At that time, as remarked by 
D. Anderson, no detailed knowledge was available concerning the exact 
location of the minerai resources of the North Sea (55).
instance infra, note 72). Finally, Denmark will be included in the picture in its relation with Ger- 
many in as far as it concerna the 1969 I.C.J. décision.
(50) For a global North Sea overview see F r a n c k x , E., «Maritime Boundaries and Régional 
Coopération», in The North Sea : Perspectives on Régional Environmental Co-operation 
(F r e e s t o n e , D. & I J l s t r a , T., eds.), London, Graham & Trotman, pp. 215-227 (1990). See also 
the following more updated article by the same author limited to the practice of the E.C. mem- 
ber states inter se : «EC Maritime Zones : The Délimitation Aspect», 23, Océan Development and 
International Law Journal, pp. 239-258 (1992), and more specifically the part on the North Sea
'  (pp. 243-245).
(51) The instant section of this article, unless otherwise indicated, is based on previously writ- 
ten articles by the present author, as mentioned supra, note 50. Even though the bilatéral 
agreements cited in this part can ail be found in International Maritime Boundaries, supra, 
note 20, reference its made to more readily available sources such as L.N.T.S., U.N.T.S and the 
like.
(52) A n d e r s o n , D., supra, note 28, pp. 333-334.
(53) The origin of this notion is usually traced back to the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the 
Continental Shelf. See Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the 
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, September 28, 1945, 10 
Fed. Reg. 12303 (October 2, 1945). About a decade later this notion was already codified by the 
1958 Continental Shelf Convention.
(54) See L e g a u l t , L. & H a n k e y , B., «Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Propor- 
tionality in Maritime Boundary Délimitation», in International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1, 
supra, note 20, p. 203, 205, who are of the opinion that before the 1969 I.C.J. décision « most 
policy-makers assumed the existence of a binding legal presumption in favor of the equidistance 
method, whether under treaty law or customary law. The equidistance method therefore tended 
to predominate in boundary agreements concluded before 1969 ».
(55) A n d e r s o n , D., supra, note 28, p. 334.
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The Fédéral Republic of Germany and The Netherlands were the fîrst 
countries to delimit a, be it short (56), segment of their continental shelf in
1964 (57). This was the fîrst agreement within the framework outlined 
above to be signed in the area.
The fîrst continental shelf agreement to enter into force, however, was 
agreed upon between Norway and the United Kingdom (58). Special about 
this agreement is that the parties involved totally ignored the existence of 
the Norwegian Trench, which is well over 200 m deep and runs parallel to 
the Norwegian coast in its immediate vicinity. The I.C.J. later remarked, 
obiter dicta, that the shelf on the other side of the trench, that is up to the 
equidistance line, could not be considered as adjacent continental shelf 
according to international law (59). Nevertheless, the extension of this line 
to the north arrived at by the parties in 1978 (60), that is well after this 
décision of the I.C.J., once again disregarded the particular géologie and 
géomorphologie features of the région. Equidistance as a rule of délimita­
tion, in order words, immediately found some strong supporters in the 
North Sea area.
Because Denmark, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were 
moreover of the opinion that, based on this strict application of the equi­
distance principle, they were the only countries (61) whose continental 
shelves would reach the center of the North Sea, three agreements were 
concluded in the period 1965-66. First the longest segment was defîned 
between The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (62), followed by 
similar agreements based on the equidistance principle between Denmark
(56) The segment measured only 26 n.m.
(57) Agreement Between the Fédéral Republic o f Germany and the Kingdom of The 
Netherlands Concerning the Latéral Délimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Vicinity of the 
Coast, December 1, 1964, 550 U.N.T.S. 123. This agreement entered into force on September 18, 
1965. A similar step was taken by Denmark and the Fédéral Republic o f Germany shortly 
afterward. Agreement Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Fédéral Republic o f Germany 
Concerning the Délimitation, in Coastal Régions, of the Continental Shelf of the North Sea, 
June 9, 1965, 570 U.N.T.S. 91. This agreement entered into force on May 27, 1966.
(58) Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the Two 
Countries, March 10, 1965, 551 U.N.T.S. 214. This agreement entered into force on June 29, 
1965.
(59) North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, swpra, note 10, p. 32.
(60) Protocol Supplementary of the Agreement of March 10, 1965, Between the Kingdom of 
Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Relating to the 
Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the Two Countries, December 22, 1978, as reprin- 
ted in Atlante dei Confini Sottomarini (Conforti, B. & Francalanci, G., eds.), Vol. 1, Milan, Dott. 
A. Giuffrè Ed., p. 30 (1979). This agreement entered into force on Februaiy 20, 1980.
(61) Together with Norway, as mentioned above. See supra, note 58.
(62) Agreement Between the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the 
North Sea, October 6, 1965, 695 U.N.T.S. 113. This agreement entered into force on Decem­
ber 23, 1966.
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and the United Kingdom on the one hand (63) and Denmark and The 
Netherlands on the other (64). The I.C.J., however, was to décidé 
otherwise.
On February 2, 1967 an agreement had been signed between Denmark 
and the Fédéral Republic of Germany in order to submit their maritime 
délimitation dispute to the I.C.J. On the same day, the Fédéral Republic 
of Germany and The Netherlands had signed an exact similar agreement. 
In simple terms the problem centered around the particular physical 
geography of the area : Denmark and The Netherlands possessed convex 
coastlines, whereas that of the Fédéral Republic of Germany, located in 
between, had a concave form. The resuit was that the former two countries 
favored the application of the equidistance principle. The Fédéral Republic 
of Germany, on the other hand, pretended that its continental shelf 
extended to the center of the North Sea. The Court’s décision of February 
20, 1969, satisfied this basic German contention (65). This dictum totally 
enervated the legal presumption in favor of equidistance, if the latter had 
ever existed (66). However, since the Court was not asked to draw the 
actual boundary line, separate agreements were concluded between the 
interested parties soon afterward. Early 1971 Denmark and The 
Netherlands concluded an agreement with the Fédéral Republic of Ger­
many (67) based on the principles enunciated by the Court’s ruling. Since 
Denmark, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom had already delimited 
their respective boundaries in the center of the North Sea, ail of them had 
to be redrawn (68). Because the Fédéral Republic of Germany obtained a 
9.4 n.m. continental shelf boundary with the United Kingdom (69), new
(63) Agreement Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf, March 3, 1966, 
592 U.N.T.S. 209. This agreement entered into force on February 6, 1967.
(64) Agreement Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of The Netherlands 
Concerning the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, March 31,1966, 
604 U.N.T.S. 209. This agreement entered into force on August 1, 1967.
(65) North Sea Continental Shelf, swpra, note 10, p. 3 et seq.
(66) O x m a n , B., «Political, Stratégie, and Historical Considérations», in International 
Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1, supra, note 20, p. 3, 16.
(67) Agreement Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Fédéral Republic o f Germany 
Concerning the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, January 28, 1971, 
857 U.N.T.S. 109 (this agreement entered into force on December 7, 1972) and Agreement 
Between the Fédéral Republic o f Germany and the Kingdom of The Netherlands Concerning the 
Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, January 28, 1971, 857 U.N.T.S. 130 
(this agreement entered into force on December 7, 1972).
(68) The boundary between Denmark and The Netherlands (see supra, note 64) for the simple 
reason that both countries no longer possessed a common boundary. The agreements between 
Denmark and the United Kingdom (see mpra, note 63) and between The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom (see mpra, note 62) were changed either by means of a new agreement or an 
amending protocol. See infra, notes 70 and 71.
(69) Agreement Between the Fédéral Republic o f Germany and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the 
North Sea, November 25, 1971, 880 U.N.T.S. 185. This agreement entered into force on Decem­
ber 7, 1972.
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agreements were to be concluded between the United Kingdom on one 
hand, and Denmark (70) and The Netherlands (71) on the other. 
In order to be complete, one should add one later continental shelf 
délimitation between France and the United Kingdom, arrived at during 
the early 1980s. This agreement delimited their maritime boundary east of 
0° 30’ west of Greenwich (72). The line stopped short of the tri-junction 
point with Belgium (73). Because of the geographical balance between the 
opposite coasts facing each other in the Straits of Dover area, simplified 
equidistance was thought to resuit in an equitable solution (74). 
Except for the continental shelf boundary between Belgium and The 
Netherlands (75), a complete continental shelf boundary délimitation has in 
other words been arrived at in the area. 
B. —  Territorial sea 
Of much more recent nature is the territorial sea boundary between 
France and the United Kingdom (76). In fact, this was no new boundary 
for it only relabeled part of a previously concluded continental shelf agree-
(70) Agreement Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the Two 
Countries, November 25, 1971, as reprinted in United Nations Législative Series : National 
Législation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea (ST/LEG/SER.B/16) p. 481 (1974). This 
agreement entered into force on December 7, 1972.
(71) Protocol Amending the Agreement Between the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of October 6, 1965, Relating to the 
Délimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea Between the Two Countries, Novem­
ber 25, 1971, as reprinted in ibid., p. 430. This protocol entered into force on December 7, 1972.
(72) Agreement Between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Area East of 
30 Minutes West of the Greenwich Meridian, June 24, 1982, as reprinted in Atlante dei Gonfini 
Sottomarini (C o n f o r t i , B., Fbancalanoi, G., L à b e l l a , A. & Romano, D., eds.), Vol. 2, Milano, 
Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, pp. 13-15 (1987). This agreement entered into force on February 4,
1983.
(73) See Art. 2.
(74) According to Lt. Cdr. Carleton of the Hydrographie Department of the U.K. Ministry 
of Defence, « (t)his was the fîrst bilatéral negotiation where it could be said that the UK began 
to think in terms of an equitable solution, as opposed to pure equidistance». See Ca b l e t o n , C.,
« The Evolution of the Maritime Boundary------- The UK Expérience in the Southern North Sea
and Channel», 7, International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, p. 99, 104 (1992). He 
furthermore argues that equitable resuit considérations allowed the United Kingdom to proceed 
with the délimitation as if she also claimed at 12 n.m. territorial sea, quod non at that time (see 
infra, note 174), just like France (see infra, note 158). The line obtained by this exercise, accord­
ing to Carleton, was then simplified on an area-compensated basis.
(75) See F r a n c k x , E., supra, note 6, pp. 64-65 and 69-71 for a général discussion.
(76) Agreement Between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Territorial Sea in the Straits of Dover, 
November 2, 1988, as reprinted in 4, International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, pp. 155- 
157 (1989). This agreement entered into force on April 6, 1989.
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ment (77) as territorial sea agreement (78). This beoame necessary after the 
United Kingdom had extended its territorial sea to 12 n.m. in 1987 (79).
Two other lingering territorial sea boundaries have to be mentioned here, 
if the Belgian-French boundary is discounted as mentioned above. A fîrst 
non-settled territorial sea boundary still exists between Belgium and The 
Netherlands involving the unresolved historical Wielingen-problem (80). A 
second one relates to the territorial sea between Germany and The 
Netherlands where a century-old boundary dispute concerning the Ems- 
Dollard région still prevents parties to arrive at an agreed boundary 
délimitation (81).
Apparently the territorial sea was not a priority area in the minds of 
governments when they started to negotiate the settlement of their 
maritime boundaries in the 1960s.
C. — Fishery and exclusive 
economic zone
Not one single fishery or exclusive economic zone boundary has so far 
been delimited in the area here under considération. Reference is usually 
made to the Common Fishery Policy established by the European Com- 
munities (82) in 1983, which removed the need for negotiating common 
fisheries boundaries between member states, in order to explain the absence 
of any fishery boundary between them (83).
With only one state claiming an economic zone in that area (84), it 
appears moreover difficult to arrive at a Materai economic zone délimita­
tion. As explained elsewhere, however, state practice in other parts of the
(77) See supra, note 72.
(78) Such a technique is quite novel in the international state practice. See C o l s o n , D., « The 
Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements », in International Maritime Boundaries, supra, 
note 20, p. 41, 47. The line was defîned by means of six points. When excluding the two terminal 
points, the coordinates of the remaining four tuming points correspond with those used by the 
1982 agreement (see infra, note 72). The two terminal points of this 1988 agreement are located 
on the line between the fîrst and last of these just-mentioned remaining four turning points and 
the next tuming point of the previously concluded continental shelf boundary of 1982.
(79) See infra, note 174.
(80) The Wielingen constitutes a major access route to the river Scheldt. Although located 
off the Belgian coast, The Netherlands claim the Wielingen based on historie title. For recent 
literature, see for instance S o m e r s , E., « The Problem of the Wielingen : The Délimitation of the 
Belgian Territorial Sea with Respect to The Netherlands», 3, International Journal of Estuarine 
and Coastal Law, pp. 19-36 (1988) and Roos, D., « Zeeuws territoriaal water en de Wielingen- 
kwestie in historisch perspectief», 4, Zeeuws Tijdschrift, pp. 124-132 (1985).
(81) In simple terms, it can be said that the Fédéral Republic o f Germany pretends that the 
entire Ems estuary forms part of German territory whereas The Netherlands claim that the 
maritime boundary follows the thalweg of the principal navigational channel.
(82) Hereinafter cited as E.C.
(83) See nevertheless, F r a n c k x , E., «Maritime Boundaries and Régional Coopération», 
supra, note 50, pp. 223-224. See also C h u r c h il l , R., EEC Fisheries Law, Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff, p. 79 n. 79 (1987).
(84) Namely France. See infra, notes 165 and 168.
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world indicates that délimitation agreements can include the exclusive 
economic zone in their purview even though only one of the parties 
actually claims such a zone at the time of signature (85). Examples even 
exist of agreements which expressis verbis include the economic zone to be 
included in the délimitation process even though none of the parties 
involved claimed such a zone at the time of the conclusion of the agree­
ment (86).
D. —  Final remaries
This wraps up this brief survey of the past délimitation practice of the 
countries surrounding Belgium in the North Sea. It is clear from the above 
that délimitation efforts in the area here under considération centered 
around the continental shelf notion. Most of them were concluded during 
the second half of the 1960s, early 1970s. The délimitation of the territorial 
sea only followed much later. Fishery and exclusive economic zone boun­
daries are even totally absent.
This sub-regional practice fits perfectly well into the overall practice of 
the states bordering the North Sea. Indeed, it were these early continental 
shelf délimitation agreements which for a long time made the North Sea 
area as a whole stand out as a model région in this respect (87). As time 
passed by, however, the few remaining lacunae in the continental shelf 
délimitation and the quasi-absence of territorial sea délimitations made
(85) See F r a n c k x , E., « EC Maritime Zones : The Délimitation Aspect», mpra, note 50, 
p. 245. The example provided there relates to the practice of the former U.S.S.R. in the Baltic 
Sea. Although this country was for many years the only coastal state claiming an exclusive 
economic zone in this area, ail its délimitation agreements concluded after the establishment of 
such a zone in 1984 included the exclusive economic zone as zone to be deli'mited.
(86) Treaty Between the German Democratie Republic and the People’s Republic of Poland 
concerning the Délimitation of the Sea Areas in the Oder Bight, May 22, 1989. An English trans­
lation, together with a legal analysis, can be found in F r a n c k x , E., « The 1989 Maritime Bound­
ary Délimitation Agreement between the GDR and Poland», 4, International Journal of 
Estuarine and Coastal Law, pp. 237, 249-251 (1989). See especially Art. 5(2). This agreement 
entered into force on June 13, 1989. Poland only established an exclusive economic zone about 
two years later. See K w ia t k o w s k a , B., « 1991 Polish Législation on the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Other Maritime Spaces », 6, International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, 
pp. 364-370 (1991). The text of this law was later also reproduced in 21, Bulletin du Droit de la 
Mer, pp. 71-75 (août 1992). Because of the impact of the German unification on this boundary 
(for a discussion, see F r a n c k x , E., « International Coopération in Respect of the Baltic Sea », in 
The Ghanging Polüical Structure of Europe : Aspects of International Law (L e f e b e r , R., 
F t t z m a u r ic e , M. & V i e r d a g , E., eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 245, 262-267 (1991)), 
this agreement forms now an example where only one of the parties to an agreement delimiting 
the economic zone is actually claiming such a zone.
(87) See for instance P r e s c o t t , V., The Maritime Political Boundaries ofthe World, London, 
Methuen, p. 291 (1985).
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other régions, like the Baltic, take over this leading rôle (88). Belgian state 
practice, as typified above (89), may not pass unnoticed in this respect.
Before concluding this survey it appears appropriate to refer to the 
fondamental observation made by D. Anderson when looking for régional 
practices in his contribution to the maritime boundary project of the 
American Society of International Law. One of the most salient features 
remarked by this author is a distinction which has to be noted between the 
délimitation method generally adhered to before and after the I.C.J. 
delivered its judgement in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. If before 
the 1969 I.C.J. décision maritime délimitation had been guided by a rather 
strict equidistance rule, this totally changed afterward :
« Ail these agreements [i.e. concluded after the 1969 I.C.J. judgement] were 
based to a greater or lesser extent upon equitable principles other than equi­
distance » (90).
It is submitted that this fondamental observation applies with the same 
vigour to the practice of Belgium’s maritime neighbors in the North Sea, 
as illustrated above.
With this basic rule of thumb to be discerned in previous régional prac­
tice in mind, we will now turn to the Belgian practice.
III. —  B e l g i a n  p r a c t i c e
It has been stated above that the rules of international law with respect 
to the délimitation of maritime spaces have undergone quite substantial 
changes over a relatively short period of time, elapsed since these rules 
became in the spotlight of public attention. Indeed, modem délimitation 
practice only emerged after the 1945 Truman proclamation on the Con­
tinental Shelf (91) when resource development stimulated the international 
interest in the issue. This development was foremost triggered by the 
pressure felt by states to delimit their newly acquired resource zones in the 
years to follow (92), be it continental shelf or even fishery zones as some 
countries, not interested in the minerai resources but rather in the living
(88) Statement fîrst made by the present author at a Conference on Ecology and Law in the 
Baltic Sea Area : Sources and Developments, held in Riga, Latvia, on August 26-31, 1990. Sum- 
mary reproduced in F r a n c k x , E., «Maritime Boundaries and Régional Coopération in the 
Baltic», 20, International Journal of Legal Information, pp. 18-23 (1992). See also by the same 
author, «Maritime Boundaries and Régional Coopération», swpra, note 50, pp. 225-227.
(89) See swpra, note 7 and accompanying text.
(90) A n d e r s o n , D., supra, note 28, p. 335. For the élaboration of this parfcicular submission 
in further detail, see pp. 333-336.
(91) See supra, note 53.
(92) 1940 was the starting date chosen by the project leaders for maritime boundary set­
tlements to be included in the International Maritime Boundary project. In this respect, see also 
Ch a b n e y , J., supra, note 26, p. xxvi.
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resources of the superjacent waters, had corne to interpret the Truman 
Proclamation on the Continental Shelf.
A. —  Early 'practice
This does not imply that no maritime boundaries were settled before that 
date or that the issue had not been on the agenda of international fora. It 
simply means that the previous practice relates to a time that the notion 
of maritime boundary délimitation did not arouse the same général interest 
it generates today. Belgium, for instance, made an official statement on the 
matter, as far as the territorial sea was concerned at least, at the time of 
the 1930 Hague Codification Conference. In a belated reply to a question­
naire concerning the territorial waters (93), Belgium stated with respect to 
the délimitation question :
« La mer territoriale se mesure à partir de la laisse de basse mer ; d’autre 
part, la limite entre les mers territoriales contiguës de deux pays voisins doit 
être tracée par une perpendiculaire à la côte, à l’extrémité de la frontière 
terrestre, ce tracé donnant seul aux Etats une mer territoriale correspondant 
aux besoins de la défense de leurs côtes respectives » (94).
Reference to the construction of a perpendicular line as method of 
délimitation has of course to be viewed in its historical context. At a time 
where only short segments had to be delimited (95) and in absence of the 
modem technologies for fixing basepoints, the perpendicular must have 
looked like an attractive rule because of its simplicity (96).
Viewed in retrospect, perpendiculars have actually been used only in 
very few cases and do not appear to have found général acceptance in 
international practice (97). Where this method has been used, reference is 
normally made to the général direction of the coast which, however, 
includes an important element of arbitrariness (98).
(93) The questionnaire was sent out by Committee of Experts. This body preceded the 
Preparatory Committee, established in 1929, which had to prepare the preliminary documents 
for the Conference. The Belgian reply, dated December 19, 1928, only fïgured in the latter com­
pilation. See Lettre du 19 décembre 1928, reprinted in « Bases de discussion établies par le comité 
préparatoire à l’intention de la conférence », Volume II : Eaux territoriales, League of Nations 
Doc. C.74.M.39.1929.V (L.N. Pub. n° 1929.V.2), pp. 119-121 (1929).
(94) Ibid., p. 120.
(95) At that time a territorial sea of 3 n.m. was generally adhered to by Belgium and its 
maritime neighbors.
(96) Especially with respect to the délimitation with France this method might have looked 
attractive. The coast in the area is fairly straight. Nevertheless, there would always remain an 
arbitrary element in the lengths of coastline parties should take into account to determine this 
général direction of the coast.
(97) This is the conclusion reached by L . Legault and B. Hankey in their recent analysis of 
the methods that have been used in maritime boundary délimitation so far. See L e g a u l t , L. & 
H a n k e y , B., supra, note 54, p. 221.
(98) Ibid., pp. 213-214. One can easily understand the intricacies of this point if one were to 
apply this method in the délimitation between Belgium and The Netherlands.
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B. —  Contemparory practice
A study of the post-1940 policy of Belgium with respect to maritime 
délimitation matters necessarily leads to the conclusion that two periods 
have to be distinguished in this respect. The negotiations at UNCLOS III 
played a crucial rule in this change of policy which moved Belgium from 
the camp of the supporters of strict equidistance to the opposite one favor- 
ing equitable results.
a) Equidistance-period
If the period 1940 to present is taken as point of reference, it cannot be 
denied that Belgium started out as a fervent adherent of the equidistance 
principle. This can clearly be illustrated by analyzing the peculiar Belgian 
position with respect to the 1958 Contention on the Continental Shelf, and 
its Art. 6 in particular (99). Even though Belgium actively participated in 
the negotiations of UNCLOS I, which resulted in the signing of four con­
ventions on the law of the sea in 1958 (100), this country refused to sign 
any of them. Parliament at regular times had urged the government to 
reconsider its position (101). But it was only 14 years later that a law 
appeared in the Moniteur belge by means of which Belgium acceded to three 
of them (102). Even then, the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention did not 
form part of the list. Belgium has always considered this convention to be 
an imperfect legal construction and foremost objected to the définition of 
the continental shelf which was found to be much too flexible and inac­
curate and as such could harm Belgian fïshing interests in sedentary 
species (103).
(99) See swpra, note 44.
(100) 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra, note 31 ; 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, 
supra, note 32 ; Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (this convention 
entered into force on September 30, 1962) ; and Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (this convention entered 
into force on March 20, 1966).
(101) Bvll. Q.R., Sénat, N° 14, pp. 309-310 (1962-1963) ; Bull. Q.R., Sénat, N° 20, pp. 504-505 
(1962-1963) ; Doc. pari., Sénat N° 143, pp. 49-50 (1964-1965) ; and Ann. pari. Sénat N° 63, 
pp. 1746-1747 (1966-1967).
(102) Loi portant approbation des actes internationaux suivants : 1. Convention sur la mer 
territoriale et la zone contiguë ; 2. Convention sur la haute mer ; 3. Convention sur la pêche et 
la conservation des ressources biologiques de la haute mer ; 4. Protocole de signature facultative 
concernant le règlement obligatoire des différends, faits à Genève le 29 avril 1958 ; 5. Convention 
internationale sur l ’intervention en haute mer en cas d’accident entraînant ou pouvant entraîner 
une pollution par les hydrocarbures et annexe, faites à Bruxelles le 29 novembre 1969, du
29 juillet 1971, Moniteur belge du 2 février 1972, pp. 1246 et seq.
(103) As expressed by the government at the time of the adoption of municipal législation 
on the issue (see infra, note 106) : Exposé des motifs, Doc. pari., Chambre N° 471-1, pp. 1-2 
(1966-1967). Similar remarks were also made by the government at the time of accession to three 
of the four 1958 Geneva conventions (see supra, note 100) : Exposé des motifs, Doc. pari., Cham­
bre N° 750-1, pp. 1-2 (1969-1967).
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In the mean time, however, in response to mounting internai (104) as 
well as extemal pressure (105), the Belgian government had reacted in 1969 
by enacting a national law on the continental shelf (106). This law solved 
the problem of the unsatisfactory définition included in the 1958 Continen­
tal Shelf Convention by not providing a définition at ail. Because the 
Belgian continental shelf is « shelf-locked » and less than 200 m deep, the 
way out for the Belgian government was to include a very concrete 
délimitation article instead. This law (107), as a conséquence, can be regar- 
ded as a first firm exposition of the Belgian position toward the délimita­
tion question. Art. 2, which is explicitly devoted to this issue, states :
« La délimitation du plateau continental belge vis-à-vis du plateau con­
tinental du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord est con­
stituée par la ligne médiane dont tous les points sont équidistants des points 
les plus proches des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur 
de la mer territoriale de la Belgique et du Royaume-Uni. Cette délimitation 
peut être aménagée par un accord particulier.
La délimitation du plateau continental vis-à-vis des pays dont les côtes 
sont adjacentes aux côtes belges, c’est-à-dire la France et les Pays-Bas, est 
déterminée par application du principe de l’équidistance des points les plus 
proches des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer 
territoriale de chacune des puissances intéressées. Cette délimitation peut être 
aménagée par un accord particulier avec la puissance intéressée ».
Even though one commentator classified this Art. 2 as one derived from 
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention (108), one cannot overlook the 
fondamental différences to be discemed when both texts are compared 
more closely. First of ail, the primary rule of Art. 6 of the 1958 Continental 
Shelf Convention, namely that délimitations are to be effected by agree­
ment, is downgraded to a mere possible exception in the Belgian law. 
Secondly, the special circumstances exception, which formed an intégral 
part of the equidistance rule of that Art. 6, is totally lacking in municipal 
law. If it is generally accepted today that the Art. 6 provision of the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention is a rather indeterminate rule, one is left with 
the impression that the Belgian law, in an attempt to be as précisé as 
possible with respect to the physical extent of this zone, attributed to the 
equidistance rule an importance out of proportion with the actual meaning
(104) See swpra, note 101 and accompanying text.
(105) One may not forget that many délimitation agreements had already been concluded in 
the North Sea (see supra, notes 56-64 and accompanying text) and that 1969 was also the year 
when the I.C.J. rendered its judgement in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. See supra, 
note 10.
(106) Loi sur le plateau continental de la Belgique du 13 juin 1969, Moniteur belge du 
8 octobre 1969, pp. 9479-9480. Hereinafter cited as 1969 law.
(107) For an analysis, see Sm e t s , P.-F., «La loi du 13 juin 1969 sur le plateau continental 
de la Belgique», in Mélanges GanskoJ van der Meersch, Bruxelles, Bruylant, pp. 269-295 (1972).
(108) Ibid., pp. 283-285. And moreover despite the obvious desire of the Conseil d’Etat at that 
time to have the text of the 1969 law correspond as closely as possible with the 1958 Continental 
Shelf Convention. See Doc. pari., Chambre N° 471-1, pp. 4-7 (1966-1967).
of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention but nevertheless in line with the 
attitude of over-confidence in the equidistance method which characterized 
the 1960s (109). Apparently, this strict interprétation was also the under- 
standing of the executive on the subject. This can be inferred from a state­
ment made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1975 in which he clearly 
discarded the special circumstances exception for the Belgian coast :
« La côte belge, étant rectiligne, ne présente aucune indentation profonde 
ni aucune incurvation qui permettraient d’invoquer des circonstances spé­
ciales » (110).
However, a few days later the Minister of Economic Affairs added before 
the same chamber of the House of Parliament :
« Il résulte de cet article 2 que la loi a prévu la possibilité d’adapter les 
limites du plateau continental de la Belgique moyennant des accords par­
ticuliers avec les puissances limitrophes. Toutefois, il n ’y  a pas à l’heure 
actuelle des faits pouvant justifier une telle adaptation» (111).
Less than a year later the Minister of Foreign Affairs once more made 
a strong equidistance plea :
« Ce principe d ’équidistance est le seul qui soit applicable, la côte belge 
étant rectiligne, ne comportant donc pas d’indentations profondes et ne 
présentant pas de circonstances spéciales qui puissent justifier une autre 
délimitation. La convention de 1958 sur le plateau continental, par son 
article 6, précise de plus qu’à défaut d ’accord le principe de l’équidistance 
s’applique » (112).
When Belgium prepared itself for UNCLOS III, its official position on 
the subject remained basically unehanged as can be inferred from a 
scholarly article written by the Head of the Belgian délégation which was 
published in 1975. Here it was stated that the Belgian continental shelf, 
being enclaved between France, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
only extends over an area of 800 square n.m (113). The author then con­
tinues :
« et (le plateau continental belge] n ’est pas susceptible d ’extension, quels 
que soient les critères de délimitation qui pourraient être retenus à 
l’avenir » (114).
Belgium adopted a clearly resigned attitude when it prepared negotia­
tions on the subject during the 1970s.
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(109) See supra, notes 54, 58-60 and 90, and infra, note 298 and accompanying text.
(110) Bull. Q.R., Sénat 53, pp. 2032-2033 (1974-1975).
(111) Bull. Q.R., Sénat N° 1, pp. 44-45 (1975-1976). In this respect, see also infra, 
note 140 and accompanying text.
(112) Bull. Q.R., Chambre N° 38, pp. 2699-2670 (1975-1976).
(113) v a n  d e r  E s s e n , A., « La Belgique et le droit de la mer », 11, Revue Belge de Droit Inter­
national, p. 103, 104 (1975/1).
(114) Ibid.
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A last official exposition of this equidistance rule can finally be found in 
the Belgian législation establishing a fishing zone in 1978 (115). Once again, 
the fïeld of application of this law was defîned by means of a spécifié 
délimitation clause :
«Il est établi, au-delà de la mer territoriale de la Belgique, une zone de 
pêche nationale couvrant la partie de la mer du Nord située entre les lignes 
médianes dont tous les points sont équidistants des lignes de base de la mer 
territoriale de la France, du Royaume Uni et des Pays-Bas, d ’une part, et 
de la ligne de base de la mer territoriale de la Belgique, d ’autre part » (116).
It will be noted that even the possibility to deviate from this principle 
by means of bilatéral agreements, still to be found in the 1969 law (117), 
disappeared (118).
These few official observations sufficiently indicate that Belgium had to 
be categorized as a staunch supporter of the equidistance rule from the 
1960s onward and remained so well into the 1970s.
a) Equitable result-period
As mentioned above, UNCLOS III thoroughly reshuffled the délimita­
tion cards (119). If the rule on the territorial sea délimitation remained 
unchanged, the one on the continental shelf received a totally new content. 
This proved no easy compromise, for the conference was fundamentally 
divided between proponents of the equidistance-special circumstances rule 
on the one hand, and the adherents of an equitable resuit formula on the 
other. This resulted in the emergence of two new special interest groups
(115) Loi portant établissement d’une zone de pêche de la Belgique du 10 octobre 1978, 
Moniteur belge du 28 décembre 1978, pp. 15992-15993. About the context in which this zone was 
established, see infra, notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
(116) Ibid., Art. 1. From a délimitation point of view, it might be interesting to note that 
even though the law itself remained silent on the issue, an annex which accompanied the 
parliamentary documents relating to this draft proposai, included a map depicting this fishery 
zone by means of précisé coordinates : « Le schéma ci-joint délimite la zone de pêche telle qu’elle 
est définie à l’article 1 du projet de loi en fonction des points géographiques mentionnés ci- 
dessous ». A study of the coordinates listed in this document indicates that the tuming points 
used reflect the outcome of the continental shelf negotiations held between Belgium and its 
maritime neighbors during the 1960s, with some uncertainties remaining as far as the latéral 
boundary with France was concerned. The eight points listing the boundary with The 
Netherlands, for instance, are also to be found in a note from the President o f the Belgian déléga­
tion for the délimitation of the continental shelf between Belgium and The Netherlands to the 
President of the Dutch délégation, dated December 8, 1967, as reprinted in 1968 I.C.J. Pleadings, 
Oral Arguments, Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 546-549, including a map and an English translation of 
the original French text. The turning points relating to the United Kingdom, on the other hand, 
served as point of departure for the Belgian position during the negotiations which preceded the 
conclusion of the B-UK Continental Shelf Agreement. This position, in turn, was based on the 
draft line of 1966. See infra, notes 260 and 268 and accompanying text.
(117) See supra, note 106 and accompanying text.
(118) About the downgraded importance of fishery boundaries in E.C. perspective, see supra, 
notes 82-83 and accompanying text .
(119) See supra, notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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during UNCLOS III, namely the so-called Délimitation Group Supporting 
the Médian Line and the Délimitation Group Supporting Equitable Prin- 
ciples (120).
It was during these UNCLOS III negotiations that Belgium changed its 
policy on the subject. From a fervent supporter of the equidistance rule tout 
court when the conference started in 1973, Belgium turned out to be an 
even more dedicated believer of the equitable resuit doctrine when 
UNCLOS III closed its doors in 1982. When his country signed the resuit 
of these protracted negotiations, namely the 1982 Convention, at the 
eleventh hour (121), it made a rather long déclaration at that time in which 
it raised as fîrst substantial element the délimitation issue. In this déclara­
tion Belgium expressed the regret that the rule goveming the délimitation 
of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, had not been withheld 
to govern also the délimitation of the territorial sea (122). Belgium could 
hardly have thought of a more elegant way to express its full support of 
this new equitable resuit rule.
1984 was also the year that the government informed parliament that 
the equidistance method as provided by the Belgian law on the Continental 
Shelf had not yet been used to settle an official boundary between Belgium 
and any of its neighbors. At the same time it was admitted that an 
exchange of non-official coordinates had taken place between the parties 
involved in order to fîx the respective exploration and exploitation zones. 
The latter were only technical arrangements which allowed to delimit rights 
and responsibilities on a provisional basis (123). Due attention was also 
paid to the changed rules of international law on the subject. The long dis­
cussions which had accompanied this change within the framework of 
UNCLOS III were also suggested as one of the reasons why no official 
délimitation had yet taken place (124). Later déclarations usually stressed 
this new emphasis placed by international law on the equitable resuit 
rule (125).
(120) As discussed in K o h , T. & J a y a k u m a r , S., «The Negotiating Process of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea », in United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982 (Nordquist, M., éd.), Vol. 1, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 29, 78-79 (1985).
(121) Belgium signed on December 5, 1984. It was the 150th country or entity to do so. See 
Bull. Q.R., Sénat N° 11, p. 425 (1984-1985).
(122) « En ce qui concerne néanmoins le statut des espaces maritimes, il regrette que la notion 
d’équité, adoptée pour la délimitation du plateau continental et de la zone économique exclusive, 
n’ait pas été reprise dans la disposition relative à la délimitation de la mer territoriale». See 
Nations Unies, Droit de la mer : Etat de la Convention des Nations Unies sur la droit de la mer, 
New York, Nations Unies, Bureau du Représentant spécial du Sécretaire général pour le droit 
de la mer, p. 8 (1986).
(123) Bull. Q.R., Sénat N° 8, p. 296 (1984-1985) and Bull. Q.R., Sénat N° 15, p. 786 (1985- 
1986).
(124) Ibid.
(125) See for instance Bull. Q.R., Sénat N° 11, pp. 425-426 (1987-1988).
When Belgium enlarged its territorial sea from 3 to 12 n.m. in 1987 (126), 
this country employed a totally different approach to the délimitation 
aspect than the one used in 1969 with respect to the continental shelf (127) 
or in 1978 concerning the fishery zone (128). The original draft proposed by 
the government did include a specific provision on the subject which made 
reference to the conclusion of bilatéral agreements in order to settle the 
latéral boundaries (129). The Conseil d’Etat was of the opinion that such a 
provision lacked legal force unless the executive intended to request an 
anticipated approval from the legislator. Taking into account the observa­
tions made by the Conseil d’Etat, a revised draft was then submitted to the 
House of Représentatives. As had been the case in 1969, this new draft 
once again did mention the countries by name, but this time the method 
of délimitation to be followed did not figure in the text. Instead, the latter 
merely stated in its Art. 2 :
« Les accords que le Roi conclut aux fins de déterminer les limites latérales 
de la mer territoriale de la Belgique avec celles de la France, d ’une part, et 
des Pays-Bas, d ’autre part, sortiront leur plein et entier effet » (130).
But this particular article did not survive parliamentary scrutiny. The 
Foreign Affairs Commission of the House of Représentatives deleted draft 
Art. 2 altogether. The argument put forward in this respect was that such 
an article would impair the constitutional prérogatives of the legislator. It 
tended to allow the executive to fix the territorial boundaries of Belgium 
ail by itself and not by law as required by the constitution (131). This is 
apparently a highly sensitive issue in the Belgian constitutional system of 
division of powers. Indeed, already in 1969 the Conseil d’Etat had clearly 
stressed that the less specific clauses to be found in the Belgian législation 
on the continental shelf (132), were subject to the approval of parlia- 
ment (133). It will be remembered that in this latter zone a coastal state 
may not even claim sovereignty but only certain sovereign rights.
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(126) Loi fixant la largeur de la mer territoriale de la Belgique du 6 octobre 1987, Moniteur 
belge du 22 octobre 1987, p. 15290. Hereinafter cited as 1987 Territorial Sea Law. For an analysis 
see F r a n c k x , E., supra, note 6.
(127) See supra, note 106.
(128) See supra, note 116.
(129) Avis du Conseil d’Etat, Doc. pari., Chambre N° 653/1, p. 3 (1986-1987).
(130) Projet de loi, Doc. pari., Chambre N° 653/1, p. 5 (1986-1987).
(131) Doc. pari., Chambre N° 635/2, p. 2 (1986-1987).
(132) «Cette délimitation peut être aménagée par un accord particulier ... ». See Art. 2, 
paras. 1 and 2 of the 1969 law.
(133) « Ces accords particuliers, encore qu’ils n’auront pas pour objet de modifier les frontières 
de l ’Etat, seront de nature à lier individuellement les Belges par les effets qu’ils impliqueront sur 
le plan administratif et juridictionnel et, à ce titre, ils devront être soumis à l’assentiment des 
Chambres législatives conformément au prescrit de l’article 68 de la Constitution ». See Doc. pari., 
Chambre N° 471/1, p. 6 (1966-1967).
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b) Final remaries
This elementary survey of Belgian state practice with respect to the rules 
of international law governing the délimitation of maritime spaces amply 
illustrâtes that the official position of this country has not been as rec- 
tilinear as its proper coast has often been claimed to be. It started out by 
being based on the codiiîed rules of international law without, however, 
being identical. In the heyday of equidistance as a rule of délimitation in 
the North Sea area, Belgium purified this rule of its special-circumstances 
exception which formed nevertheless an intégral part of it according to the 
1958 conventional system. Moreover, the impact of bilatéral agreements to 
settle maritime boundaries was downgraded in importance. This was done 
by means of municipal législation. In this period when most of the con­
tinental shelf boundaries were settled in the area, Belgium did not enter 
into any official agreements on the subject. Non-official arrangements were 
worked out in order to avoid practical diffïculties.
It was only after UNCLOS III that a clear change in policy became dis­
cernable. From a purified equidistance rule, Belgium evolved toward a 
system where the equitable resuit of the délimitation became the central 
element to be taken into account.
Before turning to the three recently concluded agreements by Belgium, 
it appears worthwhile to compare this Belgian state practice with the inter­
national and régional developments on the subject. Ail three indieate that 
a fundamental change of accent occurred somewhere down the line. Essen­
tial factor influencing this change on the international (134) and régional 
level (135) was beyond the shadow of a doubt the I.C.J. décision of 1969 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (136). By explicitly stating that 
the equidistance —  special circumstances rule did not form part of 
customary international law (137), totally new perspectives were opened.
Belgian state practice, however, indicates that this country’s official 
position was largely left untouched by this particular fact. Even though 
this country waited to enact its municipal législation on the continental 
shelf (138) until after the I.C.J. had rendered its décision (139), the latter 
apparently had no influence whatsoever on the Belgian belief in strict equi­
distance as the most appropriate rule of délimitation. Questioned in the 
House of Représentatives as well as in the Senate during the months of 
March and April of that same year, i.e. between the two above-mentioned
(134) See Oxman, B., awpra, note 66, p. 16.
(135) See supra, note 90 and accompanying text.
(136) This change, therefore, was only codifîed on the international level by means of the 
1982 Convention.
(137) See supra, note 46 and accompanying text.
(138) June 13, 1969.
(139) February 20, 1969.
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events, the government put on record that the I.C.J. décision did not have 
any bearing on the délimitation of the Belgian continental shelf. Crucial 
element in distinguishing between the two situations, as advanced by the 
Belgian government, was the rectilinear character of the Belgian 
coast (140).
It was only much later that the importance of this particular I.C.J. déci­
sion on the Belgian situation was revisited. In an answer to a parliamen- 
tary question in 1988 for instance, i.e. well after the official position of the 
country had been adapted, reference was made to content of this court 
décision by stressing fîrst of ail that equidistance was not considered to be 
an obligatory method of délimitation between adjacent states, and secondly 
that the application of this method in the North Sea would have resulted 
in inequities (141).
When Belgium finally sat down at the negotiating table to delimit its 
territorial sea and continental shelf with France, on the one hand, and its 
continental shelf with the United Kingdom on the other in an official mari­
ner, the content of international law, régional practice as well as its 
national policy on délimitation matters had drastically changed when com- 
pared to the period when non-official technical arrangements were worked 
out with its neighbors during the 1960s. As will be demonstrated below, 
these changed had a direct influence on the outcome of these negotiations.
IV. —  1990 a n d  1991
DELIMITATION AGBEEMENTS (142)
Before analyzing the agreements themselves, a few preliminary remarks 
will be made with respect to the different maritime zones claimed by the
(140) See Q.R. Chambre N° 17, p. 623 (1968-1969). To the concrete question of Glinne as to 
the implications of the just rendered I.C.J. décision on the policy of the Belgian government on 
the subject, the minister answered : « La côte belge étant rectiligne, l’arrêt ne saurait avoir d’im­
plication pour la Belgique. » The report of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Senate on 
the 1969 law, which was drafted after the I.C.J. décision of February 1969, stated in this 
respect : « (L)a nouvelle jurisprudence intervenue avec l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice 
de La Haye, rendu le 20 février 1969 ... ne paraît pas affecter dans son opportunité le projet qui 
vous est soumis. Si cet arrêt a dérogé au principe des limites fixées par les équidistances, principe 
adopté par la Convention de Genève et suivi par l ’actuel projet de loi du Gouvernement belge, 
c’est en raison d’une clause de la Convention qui excepte le cas de circonstances exceptionnelles. 
Ces circonstances géographiques spéciales ne se retrouvent pas dans la région de la mer du Nord 
où la Belgique entend manifester ses droits sur une partie du plateau continental. » See Doc. 
pari., Sénat N° 327, p. 2 (1968-1969).
(141) Bul. Q.R. Sénat N° 11, p. 425-426 (1987-1988).
(142) The information on the agreements contained in this section is based on the following 
sources, unless otherwise indicated : Anderson, D., « Report Number 9-16 » and « Report Num- 
ber 9-17 », mpra, note 30, pp. 1891-1900 and 1901-1912 respectively, and by the same author
« The Strait of Dover and the Southern North Sea------- Some Recent Legal Developments », 7,
International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, pp. 85-98 (1992) and «Recent Boundary 
Agreements in the Southern North Sea», 41, International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
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three countries involved in these délimitations. Also their attitude with 
respect to the different law of the sea conventions will briefly be men­
tioned.
A. —  Related law in force
a) Belgium
At the time of the negotiations Belgium thus claimed a 12 n.m. 
territorial sea (143). As mentioned above, no délimitation clause was 
included even though this had been the original intention of the drafters 
of this law (144).
This country did established a contiguous zone of 10 km immediately 
following its independence (145). However, when this country decided to 
enlarge its territorial sea in 1987, this customs zone became totally absor- 
bed by the extended territorial sea.
As far as the continental shelf is concerned, reference is made to the 1969 
law and its specific délimitation provision which have already been 
analyzed in some detail above (146).
Belgium enacted a fishery zone in 1978 (147) in response to an E.C. 
Council resolution of early November 1976 (148). The latter requested 
member states to establish such a zone in concert before January 1, 1977. 
Belgium was the last country to follow suit (149). A délimitation clause 
similar to the one to found in the 1969 law was included (150).
No exclusive economic zone has so far been enacted. But reference must 
be made at this point to a Dutch initiative (151) which finally resulted in 
the adoption at the Third Conference on the Protection of the North Sea
pp. 414-421 (1992) ; and Ca r l e t o n , C., mpra, note 74, pp. 99-122. Alao the following personal 
communications were relied upon : Letter o f D. A n d e r s o n , Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 
London, dated November 21, 1991 ; letter of J.-P. Q u ê n e u d e c , Professor at the Université de
Paris I  Pantheon--------Sorbonne, dated October 6, 1991 ; and private meeting with V a n
Ca t j w e n b e r g h e , C ., Hoofd Hydrografische Dienst, Dienst der Kusthavens, on November 13, 
1991 and téléphoné conversations of April 8, 13, and 22, 1993.
(143) See supra, note 126.
(144) See mpra, notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
(145) Loi qui établit un rayon unique de douane du 7 juin 1832, Bulletin Officiel des Lois et 
Arrêtés Royaux de la Belgique, Tom. XLV, N° 443, pp. 542-545. This législation used the notion 
of « myriamètre ».
(146) See mpra, notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
(147) See swpra, note 115.
(148) This résolution was only published much later. See O.J. 1981, C 105/1.
(149) This delay was justifïed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the fact that a déclaration 
had been inserted in the records of the Council’s meeting which subordinated this date to the 
fulfillment of the constitutional requirements of each country, which in Belgium meant the 
approval of parliament. See Bull. Q.R. Chambre N° 16, p. 902 (1976-1977).
(150) See supra, note 116.
(151) I J l s t r a , T. & Y m k e r s , P., «The Netherlands and the Establishment of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone», 4, International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, pp. 224-229 (1989).
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in The Hague in March 1990 of a special paragraph in which the par­
ticipants to this conference agreed to coordinate their action with respect 
to the possibility of establishing exclusive economic zones in the areas of 
the North Sea where they did not yet exist (152). It should be stressed in 
this respect that it was at the request of Belgium that a closing sentence 
was added to this particular paragraph in which it was explicitly stated 
that this coordination should not prejudice the completion of the délimita­
tion of the continental shelves in the area and the rights to be derived 
therefrom (153). This initiative finally resulted in a joint déclaration issued 
by the North Sea Ministers on September 22, 1992 in which it was stated 
that the participating states
« undertake to initiate the process either of establishing Exclusive 
Economic Zones in the areas o f the North Sea where they do not exist foT 
the purpose of protecting and preserving the marine environment, or of 
increasing coastal state jurisdiction for that purpose ... » (154).
Some new Belgian initiatives in this direction may therefore be expected 
in the near future. 
As already mentioned above, Belgium acceded to the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention (155) but not to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention (156). 
This country signed, but did not yet ratify the 1982 Convention. 
b ) France 
Like most coastal states, France for a long time adhered to a 3-mile 
territorial sea limit (157). Of Belgium’s maritime neighbors, this was the
(152) For the text of this paragraph 36, see The North Sea : Basic Legal Documents on 
EegioTial Environmmtal Co-operation (F r e e s t o n e , D. & I J l s t r a , T., eds.), supra, note 49, p. 1, 
17.
(153) A s  mentioned by I J l s t r a , T., «Development of Resource Jurisdiction in the EC’s 
Régional Seas : National EEZ Policies of EC Member States in the Northeast Atlantic, the 
Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea», 23, Océan Development and International Law, p. 165, 
174 (1992). As stated by Anderson, the lack of agreed boundaries in the North Sea area was seen 
by Belgium as a possible impediment for this initiative to be successful. See A n d e r s o n , D., 
«Report Number 9-16», supra, note 30, p. 1891, 1892.
(154) Déclaration of the Coordinated Extension of Jurisdiction in the North Sea, Septem­
ber 22, 1992, as reprinted in 8, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, pp. 173-175 
(1993).
(155) See supra, note 102.
(156) See supra, note 103 and accompanying text.
(157) This 3-mile territorial sea limit as such was never proclaimed by any French législation. 
Instead different zones were claimed for different purposed over the years. See for instance B e r - 
m e s , A., «Les espaces maritimes sous juridiction nationale», in La France et le droit de la mer 
(Dupuy, R.J., éd.), Nice, Institut de Droit de la Paix et du Développement, p. 45, 55 (1974) and 
Q u é n e u d e o , J.-P., « France », in New Directions in the Law of the Sea (Ch u r c h il l , R., S im m o n d s , 
K. & W e l c h , J., eds.), Vol. 3, New York, Oceana, pp. 257, 257-259 (1973). The Belgian situation 
at the time of the 3-mile rule was very similar. See F r a n c k x , E., supra, note 6, pp. 49-50.
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fîrst country to enlarge its territorial zone to 12 n.m. in 1971 (158). This 
law included a délimitation provision which relied on the principle of the 
médian line (159).
This country also enacted a customs zone during the late 1980s specifi- 
cally aimed at drug prévention (160). In this zone, France also claims cer­
tain rights with respect to maritime cultural property (161). The field of 
application of both laws between 12 and 24 n.m. was merely subjected to 
délimitation agreements with neighboring states without reference to any 
particular method (162).
With respect to the continental shelf France took a rather reluctant 
attitude (163). Its national législation on the subject was not very précisé 
with respect to its field of application (164). Reference was simply made to 
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. No délimitation provision was 
included.
France was also the first E.C. member state to enact an exclusive 
economic zone in the North Sea in 1976 (165). It had therefore no trouble 
to comply with the E.C. Council resolution of 1976 to extend the fishery 
zones to 200 n.m as of 1 January 1977 (166). No délimitation provisions 
were to be found in this very concise law on the exclusive economic zone 
which only stated that the conditions and dates of entry into force off the
(158) Loi N° 71-1060 du 24 décembre 1971, Journal Officiel du 30 décembre 1971, p. 12899. 
Reprinted in Western Europe and the Development of the Law of the Sea (Durante, F. & Rodino, 
W., eds.), Vol. 1, New York, Oceana, France, pp. 91-92 (1980).
(159) Art. 2 states : « Sauf convention particulière, la largeur des eaux territoriales ne s’étend 
pas au-delà d’une ligne médiane dont tous les points sont équi-distants des points les plus proches 
des lignes de base des côtes françaises et des côtes des pays étrangers qui font face aux côtes 
françaises ou qui leur sont limitrophes».
(160) Loi N° 87-1157 du 31 décembre 1987, Journal Officiel du 5 janvier 1988, p. 159. As 
reprinted in 12, Bulletin du Droit de la Mer, pp. 11-12 (décembre 1988). For a commentary, see 
Q u é n e u d e c , J.-P., «Chronique du droit de la mer», 33, Annuaire Français de Droit Interna­
tional, p. 639, 645 (1987).
(161) Loi N° 89-874 du 1er décembre 1989, Journal Officiel du 5 décembre 1989, p. 15033. As 
reprinted in 16, Bulletin du Droit de la Mer, pp. 12-16 (décembre 1990). For a commentary see 
Q u é n e u d e c , J.-P., «Chronique du droit de la mer», 36, Annuaire Français de Droit Interna­
tional, pp. 744, 753-755 (1990).
(162) Arts. 9 and 12 respectively.
(163) See also infra, note 170 and accompanying text. But even then, the French enactment 
preceded the Belgian law of 1969. See supra, note 106.
(164) Loi N° 68-1181 du 30 décembre 1968, Jdxirnal Officiel du 31 décembre 1968, pp. 12404- 
12407. Reprinted in Western Europe and the Devélopment of the Law of the Sea (D u r a n t e , F. 
& R o d in o , W., eds.), Vol. 1, supra, note 158, France, pp. 43-49.
(165) Loi N° 76-655 du 16 juillet 1976, Journal Officiel du 18 juillet 1976, p. 4299. Reprinted 
in Western Europe and the Development of the Law of the Sea (D u r a n t e , F. & R o d in o , W., 
eds.), Vol. 1, supra, note 158, France, pp. 161-162. An English translation can be found in United 
Nations, The Law of the Sea : National Législation on the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Economic 
Zone and the Exclusive Fishery Zone, New York, Office of the Special Représentative of the 
Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea, pp. 101-102 (1986). This law entered into force on 
July 18, 1976.
(166) See supra, note 148.
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various coasts of the territory of the Republic would follow later (167). 
When France did create an economic zone off its western metropolitan 
coast in 1977 (168), the délimitation aspect was touched upon, but only by 
stating that the boundaries of that zone were subject to délimitation 
agreements with neighboring states (169).
France is not a party to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. This coun­
try did accédé to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, but only in
1965 (170). This ratification, however was subject to réservations, of which 
some related to the North Sea.
« Le Gouvernement de la République française n’acceptera pas que lui soit 
opposée, sans un accord exprès, une délimitation entre des plateaux continen­
taux appliquant le principe de l’équidistance : Si celle-ci est calculée à partir 
de lignes de base instituées postérieurement au 29 avril 1958 ; .... Si elle se 
situe dans des zones où il considère qu’il existe des ‘ circonstances spéciales’ , 
au sens des alinéas 1 et 2 de l’article 6, à savoir : .... les espaces maritimes du 
Pas-de-Calais et de la mer du Nord au large des côtes françaises » (171).
Contrary to the Belgian position at that time (172), France was 
apparently of the opinion that special circumstances did exit in the North 
Sea area. France moreover signed, but did not yet ratify the 1982 Conven­
tion. With the above réservations in mind, one can easily understand that 
France joined the Délimitation Group Supporting Equitable Principles dur­
ing the UNCLOS III negotiations (173).
c) United Kingdom
This country extended its territorial sea to 12 n.m. about the same time 
as Belgium by means of its Territorial Sea Act 1987 (174). No délimitation 
method was included. But in case this country was not able to claim the 
full breadth of territorial sea for geographical reasons, as for instance in the 
Channel, provision for amendment was provided for (175).
Even though the 18th century hovering législation of this country 
provided the very basis from which the contiguous zone concept later
(167) Loi N° 76-655 du 16 juillet 1976, swpra, note 165, Art. 5.
(168) Décret N° 77-130 du 11 février 1977, as reprinted in Western Europe and the Develop­
ment of the Law of the Sea (D u r a n t e , F. & R o d in o , W., eds.), Vol. 1, swpra, note 158, France, 
pp. 163-164. An English translation can be found in Sm it h , R . ,  Exclusive Economic Zone Claims : 
An Analysis and Primary Documents, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 148-150 (1986).
(169) Ibid.> Art. 1.
(170) June 14, 1965. See also swpra, note 163.
(171) Annexe au Décret du 29 novembre 1965, Journal Officiel du 4 décembre 1965, p. 10860.
(172) See supra, notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
(173) See supra, note 120 and accompanying text.
(174) Territorial Sea Act 1987 (May 15, 1987). F o r  a commentary and further référencés see 
K a s o u u d e s , G., « The Territorial Sea Act 1987 », 3, International Journal of Estuarine and Coas­
tal Law, pp. 164-166 (1988). See also F r a n c k x , E., supra, note 6, pp. 57-58.
(175) See Art. 1 (2).
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developed in international law (176), this country does not claim such a 
zone at present (177).
Compared with the other two countries mentioned above, the United 
Kingdom was the fîrst country to enact continental shelf législation in
1964 (178), i.e. the year in which exploration for minerai resources in the 
North Sea really took off (179). No délimitation clause was to be found in 
this enactment.
This country acted in complete accord with the E.C. Council résolution 
by establishing a 200 n.m. fishery zone in 1976 (180) which entered into 
force on January 1, 1977 (181). The médian line was put forward as method 
of délimitation if no other line was specified by Order in Council (182).
With respect to the exclusive economic zone, it can be stated that this 
country has not yet proclaimed such a zone at present. But referring to the 
initiative launched within the framework of the Conference on the Protec­
tion of the North Sea, as mentioned above (183), some changes may be 
forthcoming in this respect.
The United Kingdom finally is party to the 1958 Territorial Sea Conven­
tion (184) as well as the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention (185). This 
country never made any déclaration or réservation itself concerning the 
délimitation provisions contained in both conventions. But with respect to 
both documents just mentioned, the United Kingdom thought it necessary 
to formulate objections to déclarations or réservations made by other states 
concerning délimitation aspects. If the objection raised with respect to the 
1958 Territorial Sea Convention is of less importance here (186), the one 
relating to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention deserves special attention
(176) Ch u r c h il l , R. & L o w e , Y., The Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, p. 112 (2nd ed. 1988).
(177) The Customs Consolidation Act of 1876 definitively repealed ail these previous acts. 
Since then the United Kingdom has consistently adhered to this policy. See Co l o m b o s , J., The 
International Law of the Sea, London, Longman, pp. 137-138 (6th ed. 1972).
(178) Continental Shelf Act of 1964 (April 15, 1964), as reprinted in Western Europe and the 
Development of the Law of the Sea (D u r a n t e , F. & R o d in o , W., eds.), Vol. 4, supra, note 158, 
United Kingdom, pp. 13-19 (1980).
(179) Even in a more général perspective, the United Kingdom should be qualüied as a 
primus inter pares in this respect. See Ch u r c h il l , R., « United Kingdom », in New Directions in 
the Law of the Sea (Ch u r c h il l , R., S im m o n d s , K. & W e l c h , J., éd.), Vol. 3, supra, note 157, 
p. 281, 289. As remarked by the latter author, 1964 was also the year in which the United 
Kingdom acceded to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. See ibid. See also infra, note 259.
(180) Fishery Limits Act 1976 (December 22, 1976), as reprinted in Western Europe and the 
Development of the Law of the Sea (D u r a n t e , F. & R o d in o , W., eds.), Vol. 4, supra, note 158, 
United Kingdom, pp. 345-362 (1980).
(181) As requested by the E.C. Council, see supra, note 148 and accompanying text.
(182) Fishery Limits Act 1976, supra, note 180, Art. 1 (3).
(183) See supra, note 151-154 and accompanying text.
(184) Ratifïed on March 14, 1960.
(185) Ratifïed on May 11, 1964.
(186) It concerned an énumération of special circumstances within the meaning of Art. 12 by 
Venezuela.
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since it concems the abovc-mentioned réservation made by France with 
respect to the continental shelf délimitation (187). The United Kingdom 
formally put on record that it was unable to accept these réservations made 
by France with respect to Art. 6 (188). Of the three countries under con­
sidération here, only the United Kingdom did not sign the 1982 Conven­
tion. Reasons behind this reluctant attitude have primarily to do with Part 
X I of that Convention, namely the Area.
d) Final remarks
When compared with one another, it becomes clear that the state prac­
tice of these three countries with respect to the law of the sea in général, 
and délimitation matters in particular, as reflected in their municipal 
législation, is quite divergent.
If the element time is taken as point of departure, one must conclude 
that even if some maritime zones were established around the same 
time (189), a major time lapse occurred with respect to the establishment 
of extended territorial seas (190). In the past, this had created special 
problems to be taken into account by negotiators during negotiations (191). 
By the time the present agreements were negotiated, however, the three 
countries had tuned their policies in this respect.
If the maritime zones are focused upon, one cannot ignore the fact that 
even though a great similarity exists, France was the only country claiming 
a contiguous zone when the present délimitation talks started. This is still 
so today.
If the method of délimitation is focussed upon, fïnally, state practice 
indicates that many different rules can be adhered to. But the solutions 
proposed do seldom correspond. I f  one common element can possibly be 
discemed in this wide variety, it appears to be that the practice of the 
states involved has shown a tendency to move from a system where 
reference is made to a specific method of délimitation toward a system 
where mere reference is made to the conclusion of délimitation 
agreements (192).
(187) See supra, note 171.
(188) As reprinted in United Nations, Multilatéral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary- 
General : Status as at 31 December 1990, New York, United Nations, p. 764, 767 (1991).
(189) Ail continental shelves, for instance, were claimed between 1964 (United Kingdom) and 
1969 (Belgium). Extension of the coastal state’s compétence with respect to fisheries to 200 n.m. 
was reflected in municipal législation dating between 1976 (France and United Kingdom) and 
1978 (Belgium).
(190) France did so in 1971, Belgium and the United Kingdom only in 1987.
(191) See supra, note 74.
(192) This is true for France (1971 : Médian line-------- 1976, 1987 and 1989 : Délimitation
agreements) as well as the United Kingdom (1976 : Médian line------- 1987 : By agreement). The
Belgian situation appears to indicate that the same method was always relied upon. Indeed the 
Belgian laws on the continental shelf (1969) and on fisheries (1978) are very similar in this
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But also the policy adhered to by these three countries with respect to 
the international treaties on the subject indicates little coherence. None of 
the three relevant international treaties is adhered to be ail three 
states (193). Leaving the 1982 Convention, which did not yet enter into 
force, aside for a moment, only the continental shelf between France and 
the United Kingdom was concluded between two parties bound by a rele­
vant international instrument. But even then one should be very careful, 
because réservations (194) and objections to réservations (195) made con­
cerning the délimitation provision of that convention, especially as it 
related to the area in question, showed that there was not really much com­
mon ground between the parties.
B. —  B-F Territorial Sea Agreement (196).
This was most probably the easiest of the three agreements to be 
delimited. First of ail because of its rather short distance (12 n.m.), but also 
because Belgium and France had rather similar national policies on the 
subject. Belgium was a party to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention (197) 
and France had reworded the content of the délimitation provision con­
tained therein by means of national législation (198). Both countries did 
later join the Délimitation Group Supporting Equitable Principles during 
the UNCLOS III negotiations, but Belgium went one step further by 
declaring at the time of signature that it regretted that the same equitable 
principles were not applied to the territorial sea (199).
When negotiations started in 1986, it seemed therefore a fairly easy task 
for cartographers to draw a line every point of which would be equidistant 
from the nearest points on the baselines on this rather smooth 
coastline (200). But both parties soon found out that they were in fact look- 
ing at different charts. Not that the territorial coasts of the parties were 
represented differently on the Belgian or French nautical charts, but the 
low-water mark relied upon when drawing these charts did not correspond 
at ail.
respect. One could however argue that also Belgian practice follows the above mentioned 
tendency. Even though the 1987 law on the territorial sea is silent on the issue, the idea behind 
it was also to make simple reference to the conclusion of agreements. Because of constitutional 
objections however, as mentioned above, this clause was deleted and does no longer appear in 
the final text of the law. See supra, notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
(193) Belgium is not a party to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, France is not a party 
to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and the United Kingdom refused to sign the 1982 Con­
vention.
(194) See supra, note 171 and accompanying text.
(195) See supra, notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
(196) See supra, note 2.
(197) See supra, note 102.
(198) Namely the médian line. See supra, note 159 and accompanying text.
(199) See supra, note 122.
(200) No straight baselines are present on either side of this boundary area.
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This low-water line, which is designated by the 1958 Territorial Sea Con­
vention (201) as well as by the 1982 Convention (202) as the normal 
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea and which is 
moreover explicitly relied upon by the Belgian (203) as well as French (204) 
législation, is however not a very précisé point of reference. D. O’Connell, 
for instance, in his standard work on the law of the sea distinguishes not 
less than 8 different methods to determine this low-water mark (205). The 
fundamental option to choose between these different possibilities was left 
to the discrétion of the coastal state. This results in possible discrepancies 
between neighboring countries, entailing maritime boundary dif- 
ficulties (206). Belgium and France provide a good example of the latter 
situation.
Belgium adheres to the local mean lower low-water spring (207), which 
means that « the height of mean lower low water is the mean of the lower 
of the two daily low waters over a long period of time. When only one low 
water occurs on a day this is taken as the lower low water » (208). For Oos­
tende the internationally used tidal period of 18 2/3-year was used. For 
Nieuwpoort and Zeebrugge shorter periods were taken into considération 
due to a lack of available data. About every 10 years these figures are com- 
pared with newly obtained data and adjusted if necessary. The latest 
adjustment took place in 1991 and some changes were made with respect 
to the Dunkerque area (209).
(201) Art. 3.
(202) Ait. 5.
(203) 1987 Territorial Sea Law, supra, note 126, Art. 1.
(204) «Les lignes de base sont la laisse de basse mer ... ». See supra, note 158, Art. 1.
(205) O ’C o n n e l l , D., The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
pp. 173-174 (1982).
(206) See B e a z l e y , P., «Technical Considérations in Maritime Boundary Délimitations», in 
International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1, swpra, note 20, p. 243, 247 and Sohn, L., «Baseline 
Considérations», in ibid., p. 153, 155 note 6.
(207) See chart Noordzee Vlaamse Banken, Hydrografische Dienst der Kust, published by the 
Ministry of Public Works, Brussels, January 1991. This section is based on F r a n c k x , E., mpra, 
note 6, pp. 64-65 as adapted and updated.
(208) Définition provided by United Nations, The Law of the S ea --------Baselines : An
Examination of the Belevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
New York, Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, p. 42 (1989).
(209) Even though this adjustment relates to the Belgian French boundary area, it remained 
a merely internai Belgian affair in order to have a smoother transition form the Nieuwpoort to 
the Dunkerque datum. It was accomplished after the negotiations with France had fïnally 
resulted in an agreed boundary line. This adjustment resulted in the lowering of the chart datum 
by 16 cm. Some more adjustments, be it of a lesser scale, will probably follow in the not too dis­
tant future. See V a n  Ca t t w e n b e r g h e , C ., « Overzicht van de tijwaarnemingen langs de Belgische 
kust : Periode 1981-1990 voor Nieuwpoort, Oostende en Zeebrugge », Oostende, Rapport N° 40 
van de Hydrografische Dienst der Kust, bijlage 4 (1993), listing the différences of datum between 
Dunkerque, Nieuwpoort, Oostende, Zeebrugge, Kadzand, Westkapelle and Vlissingen (situation 
as of August 31, 1992).
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France, on the other hand, uses the lowest astronomical tide as its so- 
called « OCM » (210), i.e. « the lowest level which can be predicted to occur 
under average meteorological conditions and under any combination of 
astronomical conditions ; this level will not be reached every year. LAT 
[Lowest Astronomical Tide] is not the lowest level that can be reached, as 
storm surges may cause considerably lower levels to occur» (211).
The latter method will resuit in a Une which lies at a lower level than 
if a method were to be used based on the actual measured daily low-waters. 
In the case at hand, this results in a différence of about 30 cm between the 
French low-water line and the Belgian one.
By itself such a différence may cause diffîculties with respect to the loca­
tion of the point from which to start the maritime délimitation (212). But 
if low-tide élévations are present in the area, chart data may have a 
profound effect on the charted existence or non-existence of such features. 
This in turn, will then have a crucial influence on the baseline which will 
be taken into account to arrive at a délimitation in the area.
The shallowness of the coastal area and the presence of many sandbanks 
is the only noteworthy geophysical feature which characterizes the border 
area between Belgium and France (213). Moving seaward from the coast up 
to a distance of 12 n.m. the following banks are encountered in this area : 
Hills, Trapegeer, Smal, Breedt, Kwinte, Inner Ratel, Outer Ratel, Oost 
Dyck and Bergues Bank.
Both just-mentioned diffîculties actually did end up on the negotiating 
table. As far as the starting point of the maritime boundary is concerned, 
Belgium and France proposed coordinates which differed by 1 second of 
longitude and latitude, i.e. respectively 20 and 30 m apart (214).
Much more important from a délimitation point of view, however, were 
the low-tide élévations. According to Belgian charts, Trapegeer and banc 
Smal were the only existing low-tide élévations in the area. The former is 
located 1.3 n.m. off the Belgian coast west of Nieuwpoort, the latter 
1.6 n.m. off the French coast north of Dunkerque (215). According to the
(210) Zéro (0) Côte Marine. This replaces the previously used terminology « Zéro des cartes ».
(211) United Nations, The Law of the Sea --------Baselines : An Examination of the Relevant
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, swpra, note 208, p. 42.
(212) The use of different methods (mean low-water spring as opposed to mean low-water 
neap tides) in the area of the mouth of the Thames, for instance, could resuit in a différence of 
1.24 km in the location of the boundary position. See Atjrrecoeohea, I. & Pethio, J., «The 
Coastline its Physical and Legal Définition », 1, International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal 
Law, p. 29, 35 (1986).
(213) The so-called Flemish Banks. Highet in his study on the use of geophysical factors in 
maritime délimitations, qualifies the area as a « neutral » fact situation resulting in a délimitation 
having no reliance on geological or geomorphological facfcors. See Htghbt, K., «The Use of 
Geophysical Factors in the Délimitation of Maritime Boundaries », in International Maritime 
Boundaries, Vol. 1, supra, note 20, p. 163, 193. See also his Annex A, section 4, p. 200, 201.
(214) See maps 1 and 2.
(215) See map 1.
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French charts, on the contrary, also banc Breedt dried at chart datum. 
This low-tide élévation is located 2.5 n.m. north of Dunkerque (216). It will 
be easily understood that these different positions fundamentally influen- 
ced the position of a possible boundary line to be drawn in the area, result- 
ing in a contested area of 15,48 km2.
The way out of this dispute has been clarified by the agreement itself, 
which is a rather unusual thing to do if this agreement is placed in a 
broader perspective (217). Art. 2 provides that the application of different 
methods for calculating heights resulted in two distinct dividing lines and 
that the parties agreed to divide the area lying between these two dividing 
lines in two equal parts (218). In concreto this meant that the line proposed 
by Belgium was based on Trapegeer and banc Smal as basepoint, whereas 
the line proposed by France relied on banc Breedt and Trapegeer. The area 
located between these two Unes was then divided in equal parts (219).
It might be appropriate here to refer to the fact that banc Breedt had 
already been given full effect (220) in the previous continental shelf 
délimitation between France and the United Kingdom in that area (221).
The soil and subsoil in this région may not be rich in oil and gas 
deposits (222), but sand and, to a lesser extent, gravel are extracted in the 
area in front of the Belgian coast. One of the two géographie areas to which 
this activity is restricted by law (223) lies adjacent to this boundary line 
inside the 12 n.m. zone and comprises parts of the Kwinte Bank, Outer 
Ratel and Oost Dyck (224). This zone has been reserved for the private sec­
tor. The most recent concession was granted in 1991 and allows for the 
exploitation of 300 000 m3 of sand and gravel on a yearly basis up to a
(216) See mapa 1 and 2.
(217) Ch a r n e y , J., supra, note 26, p. xxxiv, indicating that this was exactly one of the major 
diffîculties encountered by the régional and subject experts of the International Maritime Bound­
ary project.
(218) B-F Territorial Sea Agreement, supra, note 2, Art. 2. See Annex I.
(219) For a visual perception, see map 1.
(220) See A n d e r s o n , D., «Report Number 9-3», in International Maritime Boundaries, 
Vol. 2, mpra, note 20, p. 1735, 1741.
(221) See supra, note 72.
(222) See infra, note 232.
(223) Arrêté royal du 16 mai 1977 portant des mesures de protection de la navigation, de la 
pêche maritime, de l’environnement et d’autres intérêts essentiels lors de l ’exploration, et de 
l’exploitation des ressources minérales et autres ressources non vivantes du Ut de la mer et du 
sous-sol dans la mer territoriale et sur le plateau continental, Moniteur belge du 21 juillet 1977, 
pp. 9442-9445. The geographical coordinates of these two zones are listed in annex to this decree. 
See ibid. pp. 9444-9445.
(224) This zone has been designated as Zone 2 by the legislator. For more details, see 
F r a n c k x , E., supra, note 6, pp. 66-67, where a map can be found indicating the location of this 
zone. For a visual perception, see also map 2.
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depth of 30 m (225). In this zone the Kwinto Bank makes up for about two 
thirds of the total volume of sand extraction (226). In 1989 the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs ordered a thorough geomorphological study of this area 
in order to learn more about the impact of this exploitation on the 
topography, sediment characteristics and dynamics of these sandbanks. 
Again the Kwinte Bank received special attention (227). Notwithstanding 
the presence of economic activities in the boundary area, considérations 
relating to access to these resources do not seem to have played an impor­
tant role in the territorial sea boundary negotiations between Belgium and 
France.
C. —  B-F Continental Shelf Agreement (228).
On the same day as the B-F Territorial Sea Agreement, both parties also 
signed a convention delimiting their continental shelf in the area, which is 
also relatively short, namely 18 n.m. The state practice analyzed in Inter­
national Maritime, Boundaries indicates that parties normally rely on one 
single document even when different zones are delimited at the same time. 
Only when parties delimit different maritime zones at different times (229) 
does one normally end up with separate délimitation agreements. Confron- 
ted with such a situation, parties sometimes even have tried to bring some 
order in their prior délimitation agreements by concluding a new overall 
agreement afterward (230).
(225) Arrêté ministériel de concession pour la recherche et l’exploitation de ressources 
minérales et autres ressources non vivantes sur le plateau continental de la Belgique du 27 mars 
1991, Moniteur belge du 9 octobre 1991, pp. 22293-22294. Art. 1. About fîve new applications are 
at present waiting for approval by the Council of Ministers. Most o f the older concessions, 
moreover, need to be renewed.
(226) L a u w a e r t , B. & M o m m a e r t s , J., Sand and Gravel Exploitations on the Belgian Con­
tinental Shelf since 1976 (in Dutch), Brussels, Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en van het Gezin 
pp. 7 and 23 (1986). Since 1986, overall exploitation increased somewhat, reaching a level of 
about 1 000 000 m3 on a yearly basis during the last couple of years. L a u w a e r t , B., personal 
communication, April 13, 1993.
(227) For the résulta of this study, see De Mo o r , G. & L a n c k n e u s , J., Project Westbank I  —  
—  Sediment Dynamics on the Flemish Banks : Final Report June 1991 (in Dutch), Ministry of
Economic Affairs & University of Ghent, 104 pp. (1991).
(228) See mpra, note 3.
(229) This very often happens if states delimit maritime zones as they become fïrmly estab- 
lished in international law (the territorial sea first and only at a later date the continental shelf, 
fishery zone or exclusive economic zone). As remarked by Colson, most of the agreements con­
cluded prior to the mid-1970s are continental shelf délimitations, while those negotiated 
afterward have, as a rule, taken the new developmenfcs of international law with respect to off­
shore resource zones (fishery zone, exclusive economic zone) into account. See C o l s o n , D., mpra, 
note 78, p. 44.
(230) See F r a n c k x , E., « ‘New* Soviet Délimitation Agreements with its Neighbors in the 
Baltic Sea », 19, Océan Development and International Law, pp. 143-158 (1988). This is done either 
by replacing the former agreements or by changing the character of the maritime area divided 
by previously agreed boundary Unes. See also Co l s o n , D., supra, note 78, p. 46, who nevertheless 
remarks that world-wide there are only a handful o f such agreements.
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In spite of this practice, two separate agreements were concluded 
between Belgium and France primarily because, as will be explained, 
Belgium was of the opinion that the methods governing the territorial sea 
and continental shelf délimitation were different.
But before moving into the substance of the agreement, a few 
preliminary remarks are at order concerning the geological and 
geomorphological character of the Belgian continental shelf (231). The lat­
ter forms part of the unitary geographical continental shelf of the North 
Sea, stretching from north of the Shetland Islands to the English Channel. 
Located south of the Texel-Humber threshold, the part facing Belgium is 
characterized by its shallow nature and the presence of numerous 
sandbanks. This part of the continental shelf is located on the so-called 
London-Brabant Platform which formed a stable massif throughout 
geological times and remained usually above sea-level when other parts of 
what is presently known as the North Sea were covered by water. The rich 
gas and oil-generating sediments to be found to the north of this massif are 
therefore not present (232). At present, therefore, no exploration is carried 
out by oil companies on this Belgian continental shelf (233). In the past 
several requests had nevertheless been addressed to the Belgian govern­
ment in this respect, but ail remained dead letter : One submitted in 
1963 and one in 1964, because of a lack of législation on the subject (234), 
but also one in 1971, two in 1972 and one during the period 1985-86 (235). 
Even though some oil or gas may be present on the Belgian continental 
shelf, these deposits are at present of little economic value. Belgian and 
Dutch geological departments have moreover conducted a joint seismologi- 
cal study in 1991. Even though the results are still being studied at present, 
indications exist which confirm that the areas with potential oil and gas 
deposits are located north of the estuary of the river Scheldt (236).
As mentioned above, however, sand and gravel are actually 
exploited (237). Even though the area reserved for the private sector (238), 
has moved almost completely within the territorial sea after the Belgian
(231) See remarks made by Highet on the subject, as already referred to supra, note 213.
(232) H e n r i e t , J.-P., «The Pre-Quaternary Basement of the Belgian Continental Shelf» (in 
Dutch, with English summary), 31, Water, p. 10, 11 (Nov.-Dec. 1986).
(233) Information provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and reproduced as annex to 
the parliamentary documents of the Senate. See Doc. pari., Sénat N° 571-2 (Annexes), pp. 15-16 
(1992-1993).
(234) At that time Belgium did not claim a continental shelf. This only happened in 1969. 
See supra, note 106. About the reluctant attitude of the Belgian government with respect to the 
continental shelf notion prior to the enactment of municipal législation on the question, see also 
infra, note 259.
(235) Information provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, supra, note 233.
(236) Ibid.
(237) See supra, notes 223-227 and accompanying text.
(238) Ibid. Namely Zone 2.
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extension of this zone in 1987 (239), about 1/3 of the western boundary of 
this zone runs about parallel with the Southern part of the continental shelf 
boundary finally agreed between the parties. However, because of the loca­
tion of the sandbanks in the area, only the exploitation on the northern 
part of Oost Dyck has to be taken into account here. If considérations 
relating to the access to these resources did not seem to have played an 
important rôle in the détermination of the territorial sea boundary, a for­
tiori a similar observation is at hand with respect to continental shelf 
boundary negotiations between Belgium and France.
These negotiations were dominated partly by factors also encountered in 
the territorial sea délimitation between the parties, namely the différence 
in low-water line and the presence of low-tide élévations. It will suffice at 
this point to refer to back to the discussion of the B-F Territorial Sea 
Agreement on these particular topics (240).
Partly, however, these talks were further complicated by the fact that 
Belgium was of the opinion that another method of délimitation was 
applicable. Based on the outcome of the 1982 Convention, Belgium argued 
that the parties should try to arrive at an equitable solution. France on the 
other hand preferred the equidistance principle as incorporated in the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention (241). Especially the French position deserves 
some comment, because it appears to be at variance with the position 
taken by this country during the UNCLOS III negotiations where it joined 
the Délimitation Group Supporting Equitable Principles (242). This posi­
tion seems moreover diffïcult to be reconciled with the French réservation 
made to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention by means o f which this 
country objected to the application of the equidistance principle in the 
Southern North Sea (243).
This différence resulted in the fact that Belgium contended that the low- 
water line along the coasts should be decisive. As far as the continental 
shelf was concerned, this country was of the opinion that the low-tide 
élévations should be simply ignored (244). France, on the other hand, took
(239) F r a n c k x , E., swpra, note 6, pp. 66-88.
(240) See supra, notes 201-216 and accompanying text.
(241) Exposé des motifs, Doc. part., Chambre N'" 708/1, p. 2 (1992-1993).
(242) See supra, note 173.
(243) See supra, note 171 and accompanying text.
(244) For a legal argumentation sustaining this position, see for instance Caixisoh, L., « The 
Délimitation of Marine Spaces between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts », in A II and book 
on the New Law of the Sea (Duptrr, R.-J. & V iq h e s , D., eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 
pp. 425, 487-488 (1991). This appears nevertheless to be a rather exceptional position when tak- 
ing into account the broader délimitation picture of state practice. See Bowett, D., « Islands, 
Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elévations in Maritime Boundary Délimitations », in International 
Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1, supra, note 20, p. 131, 149 note 124. The reasoning behind this par­
ticular Belgian position was most probably the rather disproportionate effect o f the (contested) 
French low-tide élévation, namely banc Breedt, located 1.2 n.m. further off the coast than the 
Belgian low-tide élévation Trapegeer, especially if one moves further off the coast.
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as starting point that low-tide élévations should be counted, i.e. that full 
weight should be given to banc Breedt and Trapegeer.
Because of the unitary character of the underlying continental shelf and 
the lack of other objective parameters such as for instance the ratio 
between the length of the coasts and the area attributed to both sides, the 
parties relied on the equidistance principle as point of departure (245). The 
compromise fmally arrived at is again (246) described in Art. 2 of the agree­
ment : (247) A compromise between the two initial positions in order to 
arrive at an equitable solution (248). Belgium did not insist that the low- 
tide élévations should be totally ignored. France, on the other hand, accep- 
ted that less than full weight should be attributed to banc Breedt in its 
relation with Belgium (249). In order to determine exactly what weight 
should be attributed to this low-tide élévation, banc Breedt was compared 
with Trapegeer. When using the French low-water line, charts indicated 
that banc Breedt was 10 cm above chart datum whereas Trapegeer was 
40 cm above that datum. Relative weights were therefore attributed of 1 
to 4 to the advantage of Belgium (250). The gray zone of 182,36 km2 
created by drawing a line giving full effect to the low-tide élévations on the 
one hand and one giving no effect at ail on the other was divided accor- 
dingly, namely 36,46 km2 on the French side of the boundary line and 
145,9 km2 on the Belgian side.
The terminal point of the boundary, however, was nevertheless equidis- 
tant between banc Breedt and Long Sand Head off the coast of England 
because France had already given full effect the this bank in its previous 
délimitation practice with the United Kingdom (251). As provided for in 
that 1982 agreement between France and the United Kingdom (252), the 
Belgian and French technical experts located the terminal point of their
(245) Exposé des motifs, mpra, note 241, p. 2.
(246) For a similar, though unusual, example, see supra, note 217.
(247) B-F Continental Shelf Agreement, supra, note 3, Art. 2. See Annex II.
(248) Reference to the achievement of an equitable result is also to be found in the preamble 
of the agreement. See ibid.
(249) Concerning its relation to the United Kingdom, see infra, notes 251-252 and accom­
panying text.
(250) For a visual perception, see map 1.
(251) See supra, notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
(252) Agreement Between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Area East of
30 Minutes West of the Greenwich Meridian, June 24, 1982, supra, note 72. Art 2 (2) reads : « It 
has not been possible for the time being to complete the délimitation of the boundary beyond 
Point N° 14 ; it is however agreed between the Parties that the délimitation from Point 14 to 
the tri-point between the boundaries of the continental shelf appertaining to the Parties and to 
the Kingdom of Belgium shall be completed at the appropriate time by application of the same 
methods as have been utilised for the définition of the boundary line between Points Nos. 1 and 
14». As remarked by Anderson, between Points 13 and 14 the boundary line is an equidistance 
line based on low-tide élévations. See A n d e r s o n , D., «Report Number 9-3», supra, note 220, 
p. 1743.
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continental shelf boundary on a line constructed according to this 1982 
agreement.
A final remark to be addressed with respect to this particular agreement, 
is that at no time during the negotiations did either party raise the issue 
of a possible contiguous zone délimitation. As mentioned above, France 
does claim a contiguous zone of 24 n.m. and even included a délimitation 
clause in its municipal législation which expressly provided that délimita­
tion agreements ought to be concluded (253). Conventional law is not very 
clear on this issue (254). The fact that Belgium and France completely dis- 
regarded this zone when negotiating their continental shelf boundary is cer- 
tainly not to be qualifïed as an exception when looked upon from a broader 
perspective. One of the général observations made by D. Colson is exactly 
that reference is seldom made to the contiguous zone in maritime boundary 
agreements. He explains this phenomenon by the fact that presumably 
states are of the opinion that the boundary of this particular zone should 
follow the other agreed boundaries (255). In casu, this means the continen­
tal shelf boundary. Also the délimitation of the Belgian fishery zone and 
the French exclusive economic zóne are not touched upon by this agree­
ment. As explained above, between two E.C. member states the settlement 
of such boundaries may not really be necessary (256).
D. —  B-UK Continental Shelf Agreement (257).
In August 1989 negotiations started with the United Kingdom on the 
délimitation of the continental shelf. I f the fîrst two délimitation 
agreements concluded by Belgium were with an adjacent state, this was the 
fîrst such agreement to be arrived at with an opposite state. The coasts of 
both countries being between 43 and 71 n.m. apart, no territorial sea 
boundary needs to be delimited in the area. The Belgian coast is slightly 
concave.
This agreement fits in between two other continental shelf agreements 
concluded earlier. One between Belgium and France, as just discussed, and
(253) See supra, notes 160-162 and accompanying text, also including the French législation 
with respect to maritime cultural property in that zone.
(254) The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention did include a special provision on the subject 
(Art. 24 (3) ; médian line principle). This provision is however no longer to be found in the 1982 
Convention. About the reasoning behind this intentional omission, see V u k a s , B., «The Law of 
the Sea Convention and Sea Boundaries Délimitation», in Essays in the New Law of the Sea 
(V ttkas, B., éd.), Zagreb, Sveucilisna naklada Liber, pp. 147, 156-161 (1985).
(255) See C o l s o n , D., supra, note 78, p. 42.
(256) See supra, note 83 and accompanying text.
(257) See supra, note 4.
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one agreed upon between The Netherlands and the United Kingdom in
1965 (258). About 18 n.m. separate these two terminal points.
When the United Kingdom proposed negotiations with ail of its 
neighbors in 1964, talks were also started with Belgium on the subject. 
Both parties saw no prohibitive objection in the fact that the two terminal 
points at that time were still undecided. Since Belgium was'still shaping its 
policy on the issue, as can be illustrated by the fact that this country only 
formally claimed a continental shelf in 1969 (259), these negotiations did 
not resuit in the conclusion of a formai boundary treaty at that time. 
Nevertheless, a draft boundary line was arrived at in 1966. This line was 
based on the equidistance principle based on the normal baseline, with the 
inclusion of low-tide élévations located within 3 n.m. from shore (260). 
Following this 1969 law, diplomatie exchanges continued and considérable 
progress was made. Nevertheless these negotiations remained inconclusive 
mainly because of two factors. First of ail, the changes in the field of 
maritime délimitation taking place in international law, as reflected in the 
UNCLOS III negotiations, could not be ignored. Secondly, the negotiations 
were further burdened by the unresolved Belgian-French boundary which, 
logically, should be settled fîrst (261).
Real progress was therefore only made after Belgium and France agreed 
on the délimitation of their continental shelf, with the proposed terminal 
point being acceptable to the United Kingdom as possible tri-point (262).
When at the request of Belgium the negotiations were resumed with the 
United Kingdom during the month of August 1989, a new factor had arisen 
which needed to be taken into account. Belgium (263) as well as the United 
Kingdom (264) were about to extend their territorial sea from 3 to 12 n.m. 
I f this new element did not have any influence on the Belgian basepoints
(258) See swpra, note 62 According to Carleton, Belgium accepted this tri-point as technically 
correct by means of a note dated November 5, 1965. See Ca b l e t o n , C., supra, note 74, p. 109. 
See in this respect also a Belgian note addressed to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 
September 15, 1965, as reprinted in 1968, I.C.J. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Vol. 1, 
pp. 385-387, including an English translation of the original Dutch text.
(259) Prior to 1969, Belgium adhered to a policy of refusing to enter into $ny official agree­
ment or even confirmation of possible turning or tri-points in the absence of municipal législation 
on the bases of which such agreements should be reached. As evidenced by a note addressed to 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs of September 15, 1965, supra, note 258, p. 386. This posi­
tion remained even when the municipal législation on the continental shelf was actually before 
parliament, but had not yet been passed. See Belgian note of December 8, 1967, supra, note 116, 
p. 546. The English initiative to enter into negotiations with its maritime neighbors of the North 
Sea has been characterized as a move inspired in part to consolidate the regime established by 
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, which entered into force during the same year. See 
O x m a n , B., supra, note 66, p. 10.
(260) I.e. within the territorial sea limit claimed by the parties at that time.
(261) Exposé des motifs, Doc. pari., Chambre N° 709/1, p. 2 (1992-1993).
(262) When fïxing the terminal point of the Belgian-French continental shelf, due attention 
was given to Art. 2 (2) of the 1982 France-United Kingdom agreement. See supra, note 252.
(263) See supra, note 126.
(264) See supra, note 174.
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to be taken into account, it fundamentally changed the basepoints of the 
United Kingdom. Influencing the délimitation with Belgium are the coast 
of Essex, the Thames estuary and the coast of Kent. A bay-closing line has 
been established in the mouth of the river Thames, which forms a juridical 
bay. It runs from the coast of Kent in the south, between Resculvers and 
Burchington, to the coast of Essex in the north, between Jaywick and Clac- 
ton on Sea (265). In front of the Thames estuary many sandbanks are pre­
sent, some of which constitute low-tide élévations. Special about these low- 
tide élévations, however, is that they are located well beyond 3 n.m. from 
shore. As a conséquence Shipwash, off the coast of Harwich, and Long 
Sand Head, in the outer Thames estuary, constituted two new basepoints 
which profoundly influenced the location of the possible equidistance line. 
Especially Long Sand Head, situated at 11.7 n.m. off the coast of 
Essex (266), made Belgium double-check the exact location of this 
basepoint.
The resuit was that the equidistance line drawn while taking into 
account these new basepoints, was located overall some 4 n.m. doser to the 
Belgian coast than the informai draft boundary arrived at in 1966. It 
allocated 213 km2 to the United Kingdom, which previously had been 
situated on the Belgian side of the line (267).
In 1989, therefore, the United Kingdom started out by relying on the 
equidistance principle, based on a new set of basepoints as established after 
the extension of their territorial sea from 3 to 12 n.m. This line proved to 
be unacceptable to Belgium.
Belgium, on the other hand, relied once again on the principle of equity, 
and started out by claiming an equidistance line based on the draft line of
1966 (268), i.e. measured from the respective coastlines and low-tide éléva­
tions located within 3 n.m. from shore.
These conflicting claims resulted in a coffin-shaped area of 213 km2. It 
was agreed that this disputed territory should be divided so as to arrive at 
an equitable solution in accordance with the changed rules of international 
law on the subject (269). During the negotiations, however, a new element 
occurred favorable to the Belgian position. A routine survey conducted in 
the middle of 1990 on the approaches to Harwich indicated that the low- 
tide élévation of Shipwash no longer dried at low-water. Consequently it
(265) For a visual perception, see map 2.
(266) I.e. only 0.3 n.m. within the limit prescribed by international law. See supra, note 42.
(267) Exposé des motifs, supra, note 261, p. 2.
(268) See supra, note 116.
(269) Contrary to the continental shelf agreement with France where reference to the prin­
ciple o f equity was also to be found in the text of the agreement itself (see swpra, note 247 and 
accompanying text), this agreement contained only a similar provision in the preamble : « (T)ak- 
ing full account of the current rules of international law on international boundaries in order to 
achieve an equitable solution». See Annex III.
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was discarded by the United Kingdom as a basepoint influencing the equi­
distance line and replaced by Orfordness on the coast.
The final délimitation, therefore, was determined by the following 
basepoints : For Belgium one low-tide élévation 1.3 n.m. off the coast, the 
harbor works of Oostende and Zeebrugge (270), and Wenduine on the 
coast ; and for the United Kingdom one low-tide élévation 11.7 n.m. off the 
coast and Orfordness on the coast. It should be added, however, that the 
latter point only influenced the northemmost extreme of the line, leaving 
the rest of it being controlled by the low-tide élévation of Long Sand Head. 
It was exactly this inequality in basepoints, namely one outlying low-tide 
élévation against several basepoints located on the coast or very near to it, 
which made the parties look for an equitable resuit.
A  first problem to be settled by the parties involved was the détermina­
tion of the starting and ending point of the line to be agreed upon. Parties 
had no difficulty in agreeing that the terminal point in the south was to 
be the seaward terminal point (Point 3) of the Belgian-French continental 
shelf boundary (271). The United Kingdom was also bound by the terminal 
point agreed upon with The Netherlands in 1965 (272). This was not the 
case for Belgium, however, in the absence of a formai agreement with The 
Netherlands on the subject. Both terminal points were nevertheless accep- 
ted as defining the geographical limits within which the negotiations would 
have to be conducted. The problem of the lingering tri-point problem in the 
north was solved by way of an exchange of letters which accompanied the 
conclusion of this agreement and which forms an intégral part of it (273). 
The content of this exchange of notes is that Belgium reserves its position 
with respect to the exact location of the northern terminal point, defîned 
in the agreement as Point 3, still to be defïnitively settled with The 
Netherlands. Belgium assures the United Kingdom, however, that the 
adjustment of this point will take place within certain limits and with no 
prejudice to the United Kingdom, since it will be situated somewhere on
(270) Only the existing harbor works were taken into account, not the works in progress at 
that time in the port of Zeebrugge. This practice had also been followed at the time of the 
negotiations between The Netherlands and the United Kingdom which resulted in the agreement 
of 1965 (see swpra, note 62). This resulted in a different effect attributed to the harbor works 
at IJmuiden (completed at the time of signature, even though not charted yet), which were 
taken into account, and those at the ïïook of Holland, i.e. Europoort, which had only just star­
ted and were consequently not taken into account. See A n d e r s o n , B., «Report Number 9-13», 
in International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 2, swpra, note 20, p. 1859, 1863 and Carleton, C., 
supra, note 74, p. 101. About the influence of harbor works on maritime délimitation, see S o h n , 
L., supra, note 206, p. 155. It can be noted at this point that the harbor works of Dunkerque 
were apparently not taken into account for the simple reason that the low-tide élévations located 
north of this port were used as basepoints instead.
(271) See supra, note 251-252 and accompanying text.
(272) See supra, note 62.
(273) Both letters are reproduced in Annex : The letter from M. E y s k e n s , Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Belgium at that time, to R. O ’N e il l , Ambassador of the United Kingdom, of May 29, 
1991 (Annex IV) and response of R. O ’N e il l  to M. E y s k e n s  of the same day (Annex V).
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the line agreed upon in 1965 between The Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (274). This solution as method to settle tri-points appears to be 
unique in the present day international state practice (275).
With this particular dispute out of the way, the crux of the negotiations 
then centered around the appropriate ratio according to which the disputed 
coffin-shaped area mentioned above was to be divided. Ways were sought 
to remedy the imbalance of basepoints, which was seen as forming an 
obstacle in order to arrive at an equitable solution. Partially, this problem 
was already solved by history. Indeed, if the Southern tri-point was based 
on equidistance between banc Breedt on the French side and Long Sand 
Head in front of the English coast, meaning that full effect was given to 
it on this side of the line, the northem terminal point was arrived at 
between The Netherlands and the United Kingdom at a time when both 
countries still claimed at territorial sea of 3 n.m. This point, therefore, did 
not take Long Sand Head into account, but was rather based on equi­
distance between Wenduine on the Belgian coast, the low-tide élévation of 
Rassen off the Dutch coast (276), and Orfordness on the Essex coast. In 
other words, on the northern end of the line to be negotiated between 
Belgium and the United Kingdom, Long Sand Head was given no effect at 
ail. After complex negotiations, the parties fïnally settled for attributing 
about 1/3 weight to the low-tide élévation of Long Sand Head overall. 
Taken into account the adjustment already effected by the northern ter­
minal point in this respect, a turning point was then pragmatically deter­
mined which divided the area by attributing 64,65 %  to Belgium and 
35,35 %  to the United Kingdom (277).
The line fïnally agreed upon makes it clear that the Noord Hinder South 
traffic séparation scheme located between Belgium and the United 
Kingdom, which forms one of the busiest shipping areas in the world, was 
not given any particular considération when delimiting this boundary line. 
The latter runs almost completely in the middle of the southbound route 
leading to the Straits of Dover (278).
Reference must fïnally be made to the Art. 2 of the agreement, which 
provides for the holding of negotiations in case a straddling minerai
(274) It will in other words never oross that line to the disadvantage of the United Kingdom.
(275) Indeed, it does not appear to fit under any of the six techniques distinguished by 
Colson in this respect. See C o l s o n , D., supra, note 78, pp. 61-63.
(276) Rassen is located within a distance of 3 n.m. from the Dutch coast.
(277) For a visual perception, see map 2.
(278) For a visual perception, see map 2. Only the Southern segment deviates from this 
général direction and approaches the séparation zone, i.e. the zone separating the traffic lanes 
in which ships are proceeding in opposite directions.
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deposit (279) were to be found in the boundary area (280). In the absence 
of any actual conflict the parties nevertheless acted preventively by includ- 
ing such a clause in the délimitation agreement. It has already been stated 
before that the chances of discovering oil and gas resources in this London- 
Brabant Platform do not look too promising (281). Their location irnder- 
neath one of the busiest navigation routes in the world characterized by 
numerous sandbanks immediately to the south of it, and similar features 
to be encountered somewhat to the north of it, would furthermore tend to 
make actual exploitation a rather uncertain undertaking even if economi- 
cally interesting discoveries were ever made in that area. As far as sand and 
gravel is concerned, exploitation does take part on the Belgian side of the 
continental shelf at present. Reference should be made here to the second 
area reserved by the Belgian legislator for the public sector which is almost 
entirely located outside the 12-mile limit (282). It is true that the 
magnitude of the exploitation taking place there tended to be much greater 
than in the private sector zone (283). However, since the completion of the 
extension works of the port of Zeebrugge, exploitation in this zone stop- 
ped (284). Moreover, the most seaward boundary of this exploitation zone 
is roughly located halfway between the Belgian coast and the boundary 
fïnally agreed upon between Belgium and the United Kingdom. As in the 
previous agreements, where this sand and gravel exploitation zone was 
located much doser to the boundary line, these considérations did not 
influence the location of the final boundary arrived at.
As was the case with the B-F Continental Shelf Agreement, the délimita­
tion line arrived at does not concern the fishery zones established by both 
parties during the 1970s (285). The fact that both parties are member of 
the E.C. helps to explain this absence of agreed fishery boundary (286). The 
délimitation practice of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, mainly 
because of this E.C. membership, does not follow the broad trend to be dis-
(279) Besides oil and gas, which are speciflcally mentioned, this clause also relates to « any 
other minerai deposit», with «minerai» defîned in its «most général, extensive and comprehen- 
sive sense ... ». Sand and gravel therefore are included. Of the latter practice examples can be 
found in général state practice. See K w ia t k o w s k a , B., « Economic and Environmental Con­
sidérations in Maritime Boundary Délimitations», in International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1, 
supra, note 20, pp. 75, 88-89 and more particularly note 52 listing further examples.
(280) The agreement only states that the parties « shall seek to reach agreement ». No dispute 
settlement provision was included, but that appears to be in accordance with the général practice 
of states in this respect. See C o l s o n , D., supra, note 78 , pp. 51-54.
(281) See supra, notes 232-236 and accompanying text.
(282) This zone, designated as Zone 1 by the legislator, comprises the Goote and Thornton 
Bank. About Zone 2, i.e. the private sector zone, see supra, notes 223-227 and 237-239 and 
accompanying text.
(283) A ratio o f about 10 to 1. See L a u w a e r t , B. & M o m m a e r t s , J., supra, note 226, p. 24. 
These authors furthermore add that, compared again with the private sector zone, information 
on this public sector zone is much more restricted.
(284) L a u w a e r t , B., personal communication, April 13, 1993.
(285) See supra, notes 115 and 180 respectively.
(286) See supra, note 83 and accompanying text.
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cerned in international practice, namely to negotiate single, all-purpose 
maritime boundaries (287).
V . —  C o n c l u s i o n s
As will have been noted, this article had the privilege of being able to 
rely on some authoritative foreign sources (288) which had already com- 
mented on these boundary agreements which, it will be remembered, were 
signed in 1990 and 1991. As such this study may appear somewhat belated. 
Nevertheless, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs adheres to a policy 
which grants parliament the primacy of information, before the content of 
such agreements is further divulged. This may lead to a situation, like in 
the present case, where particular agreements have already been widely 
published elsewhere, even in international collections (289), without the 
text being offîcially available in Belgium. Indeed, both texts were only 
introduced to the House of Représentatives on November 4, 1992. This 
delay, especially striking with respect to the agreements with France, had 
much to do with the government crises which happened in between (290).
When compared with the procedures followed in France and the United 
Kingdom on the subject, this Belgian practice to submit the text of the 
agreements as draft laws for approval to parliament is rather the exception. 
In France (291) the convention of the territorial sea will not be submitted 
to parliament, because it has been concluded in conformity with Art. 2 of 
the French law of December 24, 1971 (292). The agreement of the continen­
tal shelf will follow the normal state practice of France in this respect, 
which is not to submit continental shelf or ■ exclusive economic zone 
agreements to parliament for approval. Also in the United Kingdom (293) 
no formai bill will be required because no changes in existing législation are 
called for by this agreement. It will nevertheless be presented to parliament
(287) See C o l s o n , D., swpra, note 78 , pp. 48-50 .
(288) See swpra, note 142.
(289) The B-F Territorial Sea Agreement was for instance published in United Nations, The 
Law of the Sea : Maritime Boundary Agreements (1985-1991), supra, note 8, pp. 13-14, 19, Law 
ofthe Sea Bulletin, pp. 27-28 (October 1991) and 7, International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal 
Law, p. 113 (1992) ; the B-F Continental Shelf Agreement in ibid., pp. 16-16, pp. 29-30, and 
p. 114 respectively ; and B-UK Continental Shelf Agreement in 7, International Journal of 
Estuarine and Coastal Law, pp. 115-117 (1992).
(290) With respect to the agreement with France, the Conseil d ’Etat had already been con- 
sulted on June 25, 1991 and delivered its commenta on July 10, 1991. The latter had only to do 
with style. The agreement with the United Kingdom was deposited on May 6, 1992, and on 
June 3, 1992 the Conseil d ’Etat stated that it had no comments.
(291) J.-P. Q u b n e u d e c , Professor at the Université de Paris I Pantheon------- Sorbonne, Per­
sonal communication dated October 6, 1991.
(292) See supra, note 158.
(293) D. A n d e r s o n , Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, personal communication 
dated November 21, 1991.
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as a White Paper. The application of the «Ponsonby Rule» makes it 
possible for such White Papers to receive the tacit approval of parlia- 
ment (294).
With the constitutional révision taking place in Belgium for the moment, 
it might well be that many more agreements will have to pass before parlia­
ment than is already at present the case. The 'normal’ delay of more than 
two years which passed between the day of signature of the B-UK Con­
tinental Shelf Agreement and its approval by parliament may therefore be 
expected to augment rather than diminish in the future.
With these agreements concluded, a decisive step has been taken in the 
Southern North Sea délimitation toward a final settlement. Belgium, which 
for a long time had been standing on the sideline, was mainly responsible 
for the major gap which remained. This gap has been closed now to a con­
sidérable extent. By means of an agreement concluded in 1991 (295), 
France and the United Kingdom formally agreed that the terminal point 
(Point 3) of the B-F Continental Shelf Agreement and starting point 
(Point 1) of the B-UK Continental Shelf Agreement with coordinates 
51° 33' 28" N and 02° 14' 18" E also constituted the terminal point of their 
agreement of 1982 which was left open at that time (296). This constitutes 
the very fîrst tri-point in the North Sea, arrived at by means of bilatéral 
agreements, which will most probably not be changed anymore (297). 
Indeed, this overconfidence in the equidistance method had made coastal 
states in the North Sea use this bi-lateral approach in order to arrive at the
(294) According to a convention of parliament the government does not proceed to ratify a 
signed convention until 21 sitting day s have passed following the présentation of the White 
Paper. Since parliament made no commenta with respect to this particular White Paper, the 
United Kingdom was in a capacity to exchange notifications by the end of 1991.
(295) Agreement Between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Relating to the Completion of the 
Délimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Southern North Sea, July 23, 1991, 19, Law of the 
Sea Bulletin, pp. 31-32 (October 1991) and 7, International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, 
pp. 118-122 (1992). This agreement entered into force on March 20, 1992. A material error con­
cerning the coordinates of banc Breedt discovered at the time of the negotiations with Belgium, 
and which influenced points 13 and 14 of that 1982 agreement, were also formally corrected by 
this 1991 agreement.
(296) See supra, note 252.
(297) Carleton describes this tri-point as being equidistant between banc Breedt, Trapegeer 
and Long Sand Head. See Ca r l e t o n , C ., supra, note 74, pp. 108-109. Because banc Breedt was 
not given full effect when determining the seaward terminal point of the Belgian-French con­
tinental shelf (see supra, note 250 and accompanying text) the point of view of Anderson has to 
be preferred who argues that this tri-point is equidistant between banc Breedt and Long Sand 
Head, on the one hand, and between Long Sand Head and Trapegeer on the other. See A n d e r ­
s o n , D., « Report Number 9-3 », sv/pra, note 220, p. 1743 and by the same author « Report Num- 
ber 9-17 », supra, note 30, p. 1903.
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settlement of tri-point disputes (298). However, ail former tri-points arrived 
at that way had to be corrected at some later date (299).
Ariadne’s due to be found in these three rather simple (300) agreements 
is certainly that even though some form of equidistance was relied upon in 
ail three agreements, the final outcome was in none of the three cases a 
strict equidistance line. Or to use the words of D. Anderson, the agreements 
between Belgium and France made use of « pragmatic equidistance », the 
agreement between Belgium and the United Kingdom of « modifïed equi­
distance. » (301) In other words, ail of them adapted the strict equidistance 
rule in order to arrive at an equitable solution. Belgium has been very suc- 
cessful in having reference to the equitable resuit method included in ail 
continental shelf agreements under considération here (302), even though 
its municipal législation on the continental shelf of 1969 clearly opted for 
strict equidistance (303) and informai arrangements drawn up during the 
1960s had relied on that same principle. The Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs moreover used the opportunity of the discussion of these 
agreements in parliament to put formally down on record :
« A ce propos, l’on précisera que, si la loi belge sur le plateau continental, 
adoptée en 1969, mentionne le principe de l’équidistance, celle-ci ne fait que 
refléter l’état du droit international, tel qu’il existait à cette époque et qu’elle 
est aujourd’hui dépassée sur ce point. » (304)
At the occasion of the discussion before the Commission for External 
Relations of the Senate, the Secretary of State in his comments again 
stressed the fact that both continental shelf agreements confïrmed the rule 
of law, as written down in the 1982 Convention, that such agreements 
needed to achieve an equitable solution (305).
This Belgian préoccupation, which was fully met by its negotiating 
partners, is moreover firmly anchored in a broader tendency to that effect, 
discernable not only in the practice of states in the Southern North
(298) The present tri-point arrived at between Belgium, France and the United Kingdom is 
not a perfect example of this bi-lateral approach, for it started out differently. Indeed, the initial 
French-United Kingdom agreement of 1982 was the fîrst agreement concluded in the North Sea 
area which stopped short of the tri-point. This latter method has been followed constantly in the 
Baltic Sea with success. See F r a n c k x , E., «Baltic Sea Maritime Boundaries», in International 
Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1, swpra, note 20, pp. 345, 352-354.
(299) For a more detailed discussion, see F r a n c k x , E., «Maritime Boundaries and Régional 
Coopération», supra, note 50, pp. 226-227. About the obvious danger of such an approach, see 
also C o l s o n , D., supra, note 78, p. 62.
(300) T h ese  agreem en ts, w ith  o n ly  th ree  artic les  each , f î t  C o lson ’s c la ssifica tion  o f  « s im p le  » 
agreem ents. See C o l s o n , D., supra, n o te  78, p p . 47-48.
(301) See A n d e r s o n , D., «The Strait o f Dover and the Southern North S ea--------Some
Recent Legal Developments », supra, note 142, p. 95.
(302) See mpra, notes 248 and 269 and accompanying text.
(303) See mpra, notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
(304) Exposé des motifs, mpra, note 241, p. 2.
(305) Rapport fait au nom de la commission des relations extérieures par M. H a t r y ,  D oc. 
pari., Sénat N° 571-2, pp. 1, 2-3 (1992-1993).
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Sea (306) as well as in a broader Northern and Western Europe perspec­
tive (307), but also in the development of international law as such.
At present the continental shelf is almost completely delimited in the 
North Sea except for the Belgian-Dutch boundary. Also the territorial sea 
délimitation between these two countries still remains outstanding. 
Belgium is apparently willing to finish the job. The agreements with France 
and the United Kingdom, with their strong emphasis on the achievement 
of an equitable resuit, may certainly not pass unnoticed in this 
respect (308). With the technical experts of the hydrographie service having 
done their homework, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs recently took 
a concrete initiative (309) which so far, it must be admitted, received little 
response. But contrary to the situation prevailing during the 1960s, 
Belgium seems well-prepared this time to take this last maritime délimita­
tion hurdle.
(306) See A n d e r s o n , D., « Recent Boundary Agreements in the Southern North Sea », supra, 
note 142, p. 421.
(307) See A n d e r s o n , D., «Northern and Western European Maritime Boundaries», supra, 
note 28, pp. 333-337.
(308) One is left with the impression that the agreements here discussed between Belgium on 
the one hand and France and the United Kingdom on the other, with their express reliance on 
equitable principles in the agreements themselves as well as the abundant référencés to the same 
principle in official statements surrounding the conclusion of these agreements, could serve as a 
perfect example of Oxman’s thesis that states may regard such explicit reference in a délimita­
tion agreement as a means of reinforcing their negotiating position with respect to a third state. 
See O x m a n , B., supra, note 66, p. 17.
(309) Bul. Q.R. Sénat N° 15, p. 613 and N° 17, pp. 703-704 (1991-1992). The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs referred to his personal initiative in this matter and stated that exploratory talks 
were scheduled for October 1992. See also De Morgen, August 2, 1992.
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ANNEX I
Accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique 
et le Gouvernement de la République française 
relatif à la délimitation de la mer territoriale
LE GOUVERNEMENT DU ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE ET LE GOUVERNE­
MENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE,
Désireux de définir le tracé de la ligne délimitant la mer territoriale du Royaume 
de Belgique et celle de la République française ;
Sont convenus de ce qui suit :
Article 1
1. La limite entre la mer territoriale du Royaume de Belgique et la mer 
territoriale de la République française est une ligne loxodromique joignant, dans l’or­
dre où ils sont énumérés, les points ci-après définis par leurs coordonnées.
Longitude est Latitude nord
Point 1 02° 32' 37" 
Point 2 02° 23' 25"
51° 05' 37" 
51° 16' 09"
2. Les coordonnées des points énumérés au paragraphe premier sont exprimées 
dans le système EUROPE 50.
3. La ligne définie au paragraphe premier est représentée sur la carte annexée au 
présent Accord, à titre uniquement indicatif.
Article 2
Les points ci-dessus définis résultent de la prise en compte des hauts fonds 
découvrants aux abords des côtes belge et française. Toutefois, l ’application par la 
Belgique et la France de méthodes différentes pour le calcul de hauteurs, a conduit 
à deux tracés distincts. Il a donc été convenu que la surface comprise entre ces deux 
tracés serait divisée en deux parties égales.
Article 3
Chacune des Parties contractantes notifiera à l’autre l’accomplissement des procé­
dures constitutionnelles requises pour l’entrée en vigueur du présent Accord. Ce der­
nier entrera en vigueur à la date de réception de la dernière notification.
En foi de quoi, les soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs gouvernements respectifs, 
ont signé le présent Accord.
Fait à Bruxelles, le 8 octobre 1990.
Pour le gouvernement du Pour le gouvernement de la
Royaume de Belgique République française
MARK EYSKENS COMTE XAVIER MARIE
DU CAUZE DE NAZELLE
(Ministre des Affaires étrangères) (Ambassadeur)
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ANNEX II
Accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique 
et le Gouvernement de la République française 
relatif à la délimitation du plateau continental
LE GOUVERNEMENT DU ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE ET LE GOUVERNE­
MENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE,
Désireux de définir le tracé de la ligne délimitant le plateau continental entre le 
Royaume de Belgique et la République française ;
Désireux de tenir compte de toutes les règles en vigueur applicables à la délimita­
tion des espaces maritimes, en vue de parvenir à une solution équitable,
Sont convenus de ce qui suit :
Article 1
1. La limite entre le plateau continental du Royaume de Belgique et le plateau 
continental de la République française est une ligne loxodromique joignant, dans 
l’ordre où ils sont énumérés, les points ci-après définis par leurs coordonnées.
Longitude est Latitude nord
Point 2 02° 23' 25" 
Point 3 02° 14' 18"
51° 16' 09" 
51° 33' 28"
2. Les coordonnées des points énumérés au paragraphe premier sont exprimées 
dans le système EUROPE 50.
3. La ligne définie au paragraphe premier est représentée sur la carte annexée au 
présent Accord, à titre uniquement indicatif.
Article 2
Les points ci-dessus définis résultent de la recherche d’une solution équitable 
fondée principalement sur un compromis entre deux hypothèses, celle consistant à 
prendre en compte les hauts fonds découvrants aux abords des côtes belge et fran­
çaise et celle prenant en compte la laisse de basse mer sur la côte.
Article 3
Chacune des Parties contractantes notifiera à l’autre l’accomplissement des procé­
dures constitutionnelles requises pour l’entrée en vigueur du présent Accord. Ce der­
nier entrera en vigueur à la date de réception de la dernière notification.
En foi de quoi, les soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs gouvernements respectifs, 
ont signé le présent Accord
Fait à Bruxelles, le 8 octobre 1990.
Pour le gouvernement du Pour le gouvernement de la
Royaume de Belgique République française
MARK EYSKENS COMTE XAVIER MARIE
DU CAUZE DE NAZELLE
(Ministre des Affaires étrangères) (Ambassadeur)
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ANNEX III
Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium 
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland Relating to the Délimitation 
of the Continental Shelf Between the Two Countries
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM AND THE GOV­
ERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTH­
ERN IRELAND,
Desiring to establish the common boundary between their respective parts of the 
continental shelf, taking full account of the current rules of international law on 
international boundaries in order to achieve an equitable solution,
Have agreed as follows :
Article 1
1. The boundary between that part of the continental shelf which appertains to 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that part which 
appertains to the Kingdom of Belgium shall be a line composed of loxodromes join- 
ing in the sequence given the points defîned as follows by their coordinates :
1. 51° 33' 28" N 02° 14' 18" E
2. 51° 36' 47" N 02° 15' 12" E
3. 51° 48' 18" N 02° 28' 54" E
The positions of the points in the Article are defîned by latitude and longitude on 
European Datum (lst Adjustment 1950).
2. The dividing line has been drawn by way of illustration on the chart annexed 
to this Agreement.
Article 2
1. If any single geological minerai oil or natural gas structure or field, or any 
single geological structure or field of any other minerai deposit extends across the 
boundary and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of the 
boundary is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of the boundary, the 
Contracting Parties shall seek to reach agreement as to the exploitation of such 
structure or field.
2. In this Article the term 'minerai’ is used in its most général, extensive and com- 
prehensive sense and includes ail non-living substances occurring on, in or under the 
ground, irrespective of chemical or physical state.
M ARITIM E B O U N D A R Y  AG REEM ENTS 445
Article 3
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the two Governments 
exchange notifications of their acceptance o f this Agreement.
In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respec­
tive Governments exchange notifications o f their acceptance of this Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Brussels the 29th day of May 1991, in the English, Erench 
and Dutch languages, the three texts being equally authoritative.
For the Government of the For the government of the United Kingdom
of the Kingdom of Belgium of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
MARK EYSKENS ROBERT JAMES O’NEILL
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ANNEX IV
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, Bruxelles, le 29-5-1991
DU COMMERCE EXTERIEUR ET DE LA 
COOPERATION AU DEVELOPPEMENT
Monsieur PAmbassadeur,
A l’occasion de la signature, ce jour, de l’Accord relatif à la délimitation du 
plateau continental entre nos deux pays, j ’ai l ’honneur de vous informer de ce qui 
suit :
« Le point terminal de délimitation, dans le nord-est, du plateau continen­
tal entre la Belgique et le Royaume-Uni est, selon les termes de l’Aceord 
signé ce jour, le point dont les coordonnées sont 51° 48' 18" N et 02° 28' 54" E.
Les coordonnées de ce point seront éventuellement modifiées lorsque la 
délimitation du plateau continental entre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas aura été 
effectuée.
La Belgique s’engage à ce qu’une telle modification ne porte pas atteinte 
aux droits acquis du Royaume-Uni et précise que ce point se situera sur la 
ligne de délimitation du plateau continental entre le Royaume-Uni et les 
Pays-Bas qui a été convenue dans l’accord du 6 octobre 1965.
Le présent échange de lettres fait partie intégrante de l’Accord signé ce 
jour. »
Je saisis l’occasion de renouveler à Votre Excellence, l’expression de ma très 
haute considération.
Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères 
Mark EYSKENS
A Son Excellence
Monsieur Robert James O’NEILL
Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne
Britannia House
rue Joseph II, 28
1040 Bruxelles





De Heer Mark Eyskens 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
BRUSSELS
Your Excellency,
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today’s date, which in 
translation reads as follows :
« Your Excellency
On the occasion of the signature of this day of the Agreement relating to the 
délimitation of the continental shelf between our two countries, I have the honour 
to inform you o f the following :
'The terminal point of délimitation, in the northeast, o f the continental shelf 
between Belgium and the United Kingdom is, according to the terms of the Agree­
ment signed this day, the point of which the coordinates are 51° 48' 18"N 02° 28' 
54"E.
The coordinates of this point will be modifïed, if necessary, once the délimitation of 
the continental shelf between Belgium and The Netherlands has been effected. 
Belgium undertakes that such a modification will not prejudice the acquired rights 
of the Kingdom and makes clear that this point will be situated on the line of 
délimitation of the continental shelf between the United Kingdom and The 
Netherlands which was laid down in the Agreement of 6 October 1965.
This exchange of letters forma an intégral part of the Agreement signed today.’ »
I  have the honour to inform you that my Government has taken note o f the con­
tents of your letter.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of 
my highest considération.
R  J O’NEILL
